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ABSTRACT
As a ph ilos op her Max St i rne r i s r e membered for o n l y one
boo k , Der Einzig e uod Sel" Eiq e ntum. fi r s t pub l i s hed in 1944 .
I n it he p o r tray s the standpoint o f an i nd ividual dedica t ed
ex c l usive l y to h ls own self-cering Age nd a. It i s a port.ray al
dist i nguished by a r adica l affi rmation o f i nd ivi du a l fre ed om
which Is so complete , as to chal lenge a ny traditional v i e w of
t h is mos t c omplex co ncept .
The co ncept o f ownne s s in St i r Re r 's Der Ei n z l qe is an
ex t r e me l y d if fi cult one t o defi ne . Th i s thes i s is a n attemp t
t o do as muc h through a co mpar ati ve a na l ys is o f Sti r ner 's text
wi t h s ev e r a l t r ad i t i on a l ph i losophica l s t a ndp o i n t s .
Chap t e r one e xami ne s the f reedom ad vanced by i dealism and
hWllan islll. to whi c h Stirner was so op pos ed.
Chapt e r two d i s cusses Stirner' s meanin9 o f a f i xed i de a ,
without an understan din9 o f wh i c h i t wou ld be d i f ficul t t o
proceed in ~r Ei n ziqe .
Chapte r s t hre e a nd fou r f o r m the main body of the t he sis
and attempt t o de scribe the dist inctions between f r eed om and
own ness . As will be s hown , these distinctions ha ve profoun d
ethical implicat! rms .
Chapter fi ve co mpares Stirner 's ownnes s with the
a t heistic line of ex i s tent ial t hou9 h t , s pecif i c a lly Jean-P a u l
Sartre . While e xistential freedom most c losely r e s e mbl e s the
true free exi stence Sti rner ca l l s ownness , we conclude,
however , that freedom and ownnes s are i nc ompa t i b l e c a t e gor i e s .
By Stirner ' s account, freedom i s nothing more than an abstract
ideal which oug ht t o be abandoned a l together . Thus, an
ambiguity appears in Der Ei nzl ge . The quest ion to be r esolved
is whether ownness i s something more than or prior to free dom
or just freedom i tsel f by a no t he r name .
iv
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I NTRODUCTI ON
Max Stirner' s Der Einziqe and Se in Ei ge n t uml wa s part of
a tran sition i n the h i story of philos ophy ; a t ransition from
a rel igi ou s ly ba s ed view o f the wor ld t o a more sec u lar and
cri t i cal s t ance whi ch pla c e s ev e r ything r ela t i v e to Man a s t he
a ge nt by whom a nd fo r whom t he world exists . The e arly t o
mi ddl e decade s o f the 19 t h ce n t ur y were ch aracteri zed by a
r i s e i n i nd ividua l sel f - c on s c ious awaren e s s whi ch, through
r ea son and f reedom; regard s the species Man as the centre a nd
s anction o f i1 world which has mea ning only becau s e o f Man ' s
exis tenc e . It is a s ho rt but pro f oundly i mportant s t e p from
this de ification of Man to the s e l f - proposed intellectual and
pers onal libera tion of t he radical i ndivi dua l d e s cribed i n Der
Ei n ziqe. It is worthy o f note that i n Ver Einziqe we find at
the ve r y beginning o f thi s tran sition the mos t radical
e xpr es sion o f t h i s n ew-found s e l f- cons cious and s e l f - r e l iant
standpo i n t .
In all r ealms intellec tua l , s piri t ua l and material there
i s a latent d a nger in that what seems to be t ruthful, noble or
us eful can be manipulated for destructi v e as well as
co nstructive purposes . One hardly need s to cite from a litany
l Max Sti rner , Ver Einzige uod Se in Ei ge n t um. translated from
the Ge r ma n by Steven T . Byington . Sun City, Californi a: Western
World Pres s, 1982 . Al l s u bsequent references t o thi s wor k will b e
a s Der Einzige . Where Byington use s emphas is I will underline.
o f exan'ples that history can provide. It i s a simple fact
t hat the mo~ t pr ofou nd i dea or invention can be, at once, ou r
salvation and curse. Freedom is just such a concept wh i ch
c a r r i e s with it t h e potential for ironic consequences in its
misemployment. It is a n idea l which has cultivated hu man
d igni t y, inventiveness an d conununity, yet , un derpins a great
deal of the d i v i s i ve nes s in ou r his tory.
I t seems that this is often the result of an abst raction
or one-s idedness of thought and action which ta kes freedom ou t
of t he c ont e x t o f the t o t i:l.l experience o f l i f e . I t is a rgued,
therefore , that f reedom is not j ust to be thought of or wished
t or but 15 to be expressed i n t h e co ncre te practica l
e xpe riences o f life . Richard H. Tawney in his essay Ma n Can
Be Free i n the Socialist Planned Society, expresses t he matter
as f ollows :
The re is no s uch t hi ng as freedom in the
abstr act , divorced f rom t he realities of
a s pecific time and place . Whatever else
it ma y or may not imply, it i nvo l ves a
power of choice betwe en alte r na tives -
a c hoice which is r e al , not mere ly
nominal, betwe e n al ternatives which exis t
i n f a c t , no t only on paper . I t means , i n
sh ort, the a b ili ty to do - or refrain f r om
do i n g - de fi n i t e thir.gs, a t a definite
~~~~~t~o~~i~~f~~i:~l ~f rcumstances , or it
Pre cis e l y for t he that Richard Tawne y
a rticulates, f r ee dom is most often expressed in firm
~In: Fr eedom: I t s Hi s t o r y . Nature and Varie t ies . Robe rt E.
Dewey and James A. Goul d, ed i tors . New York : MacMillan, 1970 , p.
263 .
cons Ltuc ronar terms in which the concrete benefits of freedo m
accrue to the individual only to the extent they accrue t o
society as a whole . Accordingly, freedom as a function of
political, socia l and economic principles ins ists no t on ly on
f ceedom foe the individual but a fceedom f oe a ll d i s ti ngui s hed
by a s piri t o f justice and reciprocity . This provokes t he
question as to wha t extent freedom of the individual is
compromised by the demands of any soc i a l collectivity.
I nde ed , ca n true individual f r ee dom tolerate any co mpromise at
il lJ 0,[ must it b e unreserved and uncondi tional? In othe r
words, to what ex tent is f reedom a f unction o f t he sel f -
knowing individual who , as t he agent who separates him s el f
from a l l ex terna l res traints and demands , makes of the world
whatever he will?
The r ad i c al individual t h a t Stirne r descr i be s in Der
Ei nziqe takes t he view tha t f r e edom a s a re l igious, poli t ical
or social idea l ne c e s s ari l y i nvolves some degree o f self -
r en unc i a t i on . As s uc h , Sti rner I s unique one will not
co un tenance any idea l o r co llective s ystem o f val ues which are
not en ti rely a f uncti on of h i s own choices and self-interes ts .
With r e s pect to duty a nd self-interest the freedom pe cu liar to
Der Einzige is wholly co mpleted by an uncon dition al act o f
self-appropriation in whi ch du ty has no role . This i s not t o
say that Stirne r's individual woul d no t co ntribute t o so me
common p urpose. But any coo pe rative communal sp i ri t would
almost ce r t a i nl y d i sg ui se his own co nc eal ed self-car i ng
a ge nd a .
My con cern is ne i t he r the divine no r
t he human, no t t he t rue , goo d , j us t ,
f r e e, e t c . , but so l ely wha t is !!!.!..!!!.L
a nd i t is not a ge ne ra l on e , but i s
~~:i~~e~ea~h~na:y~:~1~r · Nothi ng is
The co ur s e of t he f ollowing r e mar ks atte mpt s t o draw ou t
the imp lic a t i ons of s uc h a s t a ndpoin t, a nd to cla r ify if
poss i b le any a mb i gui ties De r Ei nz i ge d i s play s wi t h r e s pect t o
freedom with i n St i r ne r 's tho ro ughgoing e goism. Spe c if ica lly ,
Stirner ' s crit ique o f f reedom is s o c omple t e t hat a t ma ny
points in Ot!r E:indge it s e e ms he is a s ki ng u s t o a ba ndon i t
a l toge the r i n f av our of a t r ue free e xis tence he c a l ls
I s ownne s s, t hen, s omethi ng be yond or prior t o
f reedom? Or is i t j us t f r e edo lll itself i n te rms o f i t s r e a l
ground or actua l i t y ?
The me t ho d of e xpos i t i on wil l be one of co mpa r a t i ve
ana lysis l' ., ing, in t he be gi nning , i dealism 1n ge neral an d
humanism in pa r tic u la r as philos ophi c al posi tions t o whI ch
Sti rne)," is r adically opposed . Der Einzi ge will t hen be
dis c us s ed with r e spect t o i t s a na r chistic a nd e x i sten tial
the mes , two movements of thought t o which St irne r has o f t e n
been l i n ked and which perhaps mor e clos ely r e pr e s en t the true
f r ee exis t en ce he cal l s ownn e ss .
JDer Einziqe, p . 5 .
CHAPTER 1: THE BACKGROUND
1 .1 Hegel ian Freedom
Kant prov ided t he philos ophical ba sis f or a new k i nd of
c onscious ness , a consciousnes s which place~ everything
r ela tive t o i tse l f a nd for a v i ew of the wor ld as, in a sens e,
a c reati on of thi s consciousne ss . It is a s t andp o i n t which
makes everything relat ive t o the subject and in this respect
Kant was a man o f his t ime. The Enlightenment period h ad
pr ovo ked a proce ss in which the s e l f - cons c i o us individual was
to become the ce ntr e and s anc t i on of man i n t h e modern world.
Man b~9an t o t ak e a c r i ti c a l s t a nce t owa r d the old order, an
obj ec tive order heretofore fixed and inviolabl e . The
s c i en t i fic s p i r i t of the t i me encouraged a re-examination of
commonly accepted be liefs and practices which up unt il then
wer e s us ta i ne d by ml"thical and spiritual interpretations o f
rea l i ty . Universal princ iples expressed in moral or religious
terms were i ncr ea s i n gl y regarded a s unscientif i c dogma whi ch
neither ref l ected concrete human existence nor allowed for the
new-found s en se of freedom cha rn c t e r is t i c of this period i n
hi s tory .
As the Enlightenment p recipitated a new s e nse of
c onfi d enc e and individual liberty which eroded the o ld
cu ltural order, just so it pre sented modern man as the fixed
ca tegory by which everything else was t o be measured and
valued . This period s ees the b i rth of the s e lf - c on scio us and
s e lf - cen t r e d individual in r ad i c a l opposition to all t ha t i s
non-human . Acco rding to Hege l t his i s precise ly t he faili ng
of bo t h t he Enlightenmen t and Kan t ' s transcendental
s tandpoint . The hold i ng apart of the ca t e gor i es o f s ubj e c t
a nd ob j ect i . e . maki ng se l f the exclus ive r e f e r e nce point from
which a l l progress a nd t ruth in huma n affairs we r e t o be
de riv ed, was prec i sel y t he ab s t r a c t i on t hat Hege l i nve i ghed
a gain s t .
Rather fo r Hege l, th~ di a l ectical proces s which un f o l ds
i n his Ph ilos ophy of Mind establis hes freedom as essentiall y
a f un c tion of t hought a nd by a be i ng whose ve r y nature it i s
to mediate onesidedne s s and oppos i tion. It is not at a ll
s urprising t he n that according t o Hegel self-co nsciousness
canno t ex ist in isolation; i t is not mere ly self-apprehending
bu t is en ti re ly contingent upo n awa rene ss of the other for its
deve lopJllent and fullest expression . I n other wc r crs , i t
r equi res an ob ject in orde r t o differ en t iate and recogni ze
j"t s e l f . Hegel s a i d , "The object is ray i d ea: I am aware o f
t he objec t as mine ; and thus in i t I am a war e of me ... 4
However , he quickly cautions that this is o nly true f or s e lf-
consciousne s s a t a n a bs t rac t stage of de ve lopment wher e t he
freedom of sel f - consciousness is i t s elf II, pure a bstraction .
4Hege l, Philosophy of Hind . Tr a nsla t ed by Wil liam Wallace .
London: Oxfor d Unive r s i t y Pr e s s , 19 76 . p , 165 .
:inunertiate s e l f -consc i ousness ha s not
ye t f or its obj ect t he 1=1, but only
the I i therefore, it is fre e only
fo r us , not for its e l f , 15 not a s yet
awa re of its f r eedom , and contains only
~~:/~~n~~~i;na~~u~i: ~bu t not yet f reed om
In t he process o f the development of f reedom of s el f -
consciuusness t he " I" r ecognizes the o ppos i tion a nd expl i c i t
c ont r ad iction a t tendi ng t he appea rance o f a no t h er sel f-
c on s c i ou s be ing . I; Hegel t hen quickl y moves t o r e solve t he
matter i n the following manner .
To overc ome t hi s cont radic t ion it is
necessary that t he t wo oppos ed selves
should make ex p li r:i t. a nd s hou ld recognize
in t h e ir exis tence , in the ir being- f or -
an other, what t h ey essentia lly a re i n
t h ems e l ve s or a ccordi n g t o t he i r Notion,
na mely , beings who a re no t merely
na t ural but f r ee . On ly i n s uch a mann e r
is t r ue freedo m re al i z e d ; f or s ince t hi s
cons ists in my i dell t ity with the o t her ,
~l:: ~~;~ =~~ lrs f~:~o~~~~e~h~yo~:e~s i ~ree. 7
I n the fo regoi ng we have , by Hegp-l's account , an i ni tial
i nsight i nt o answers to the questions po sed at t he b eginning .
Freedom is no t solely a func t.Lon of se l f -conscious ne ss in its
i mmedi acy and henc e not simp l y a matter o f c hoosing i n
accordance with one's own des i r es . Ra t her, it r equires t he
othe r a nd can on l y de velop within a spirit of soc ial
recipro c i t y .
~ Ib id . , p. 16 5 .
6I b i d . , p , 171.
1I b i d • , p , 171.
This free dom of one in the o ther un i t e s
men in a n inward manner, whe reas ne ed s
a nd necessi t y bring t hem toge ther only
ex ter na lly . There fo re, men mus t wi ll t o
fi nd themselves again in one a nother .
But this cannot; ha ppe n so long as they
are imprisoned i n t he i r i mmed i acy , in
their na t ural be ing ; for it is just this
t ha t excludes them from one a no ther a nd
prevents t he m from being fre e i n r e gard
to one ano ther . 8
Heg e l ca lls this standpoint universal self-consciousness ,
t he affi r mative awareness o f self in another self . . . .. , 9
se lf-consciousness which is f ree only when expressed wi thin
t he co ntext o f that wh i c h i s external and opposed to i t.
consequently, fo r Hege l , t he s ubjective will in isolation
is incomplete, a n a bstract moment in which t he r a t i on al
un iversal will is limitp.d t o the form of a mere collectivity
of individual wills . But , i n a co llectivity of i nd ividua l
wi lls there is an implicit contradiction which takes t he f orm
of duty v ersus sel f -interest . Th i s contradiction, fo r which
f reedom is an inseparable issue, is reconci led whe n t he
s ubjec t ive wi l l achieves i t s freedom within the context of a n
objective wil l I.e. the state . This is how Wil lia m J. Brazill
presents Hegel' s view of t he state .
The s t a t e was the ex ternalization o f the
s pirit , the ins titutionalizat ion o f d i v i ne
f or c e in histor y . The spiri t was immanent
in history, and t he state was t he physical
r epres enta tion o f t ha t dmmane nce , The
sta te , t he n - because it was a part of t he
BI b i d . , p • 17 1.
"I bid ., p . 176.
The s t ate was the product of reason f or wi thout
the r .a cou ld not be a state . Furthermore, t he i nd ivi dua l
s ecure s his freedom only to the e xten t he contributes to the
s t a t e ; t he true worldly embodiment of moral ity, reason and
f re e d om. ll This , a l ong wi\.:h the underlying i ssue a s to
whether the whole historical process wa s s a cr e d or secular,
pro voked t he left-wing r ea ct i on to the Hegelian metaphys ic of
whi ch St i r n e r ' s De r Einzige is the most radical example .
1 .2 'I'he 1oef t-Wi ng Reaction
German philosophy during t he fi fteen year pe riod
following He ge l ' s death i n 18 31 was, in large measure, an
effort to draw out the political, social and r el igious
implicati ons of h i s thought . I t was the view o f many t hat the
Hegel ian synthes i s of t he rea l an d t he rational did no t, in
any practical sense , properly address the socio-econo mic and
political unrest which was so characteristic of most Europe an
s t a t e s at that t ime. Hegelianism wa s regarded by many as a n
at temp t t o preserve a cultural o rder ba sed on t radi tional
taWil liam J . Bra zi l l, The Young Heqelians . t{ew Haven and
London: Yale University Press , 19 70 , p . 41.
lI I bi d . , p , 43 .
Christian v a l u e s and poli t ical a'.lthori ty .
10
Moreover ,
HegelianisJl'l represented a wor l d of pu r e phlloso phic t h e ory
which neither r eflected concrete histor i cal existence nor
pronised the fu ndamental changes i n poB tical and societal
a r rangements which the mood of the time seemed to demand.
t hose people the real i n t e r e s t lay in the human, no t the
ab s olute s p i r i t .
Con s e qu ently t here was a gradual po larization of
ph ilosophic opini o n i n t he Ger man s ta tes du ring the ea r l y t o
midd le decedes of t he nineteenth ce ntury . On the o ne h a nd
were thos e inclined t o reconci le Hege l ' s absolute idealism
with the current r e lig i ous , po l itical and s oc i a l structure.
On the other was the more libera l vie·... demanding a new set of
moral, po litical and s oc i a l s tandards which would prope r l y
reflec t the atti t udes and c ondi tions o f a n increas ingly
enlightened and i n dus t r i a lized so ciety . The ideas of t h es e
liberals and t he i r impl i cations f or society we r e clearly
revo l utionary. They became known , appropr iate ly. as the l e f t -
wi ng Hegelians .
Among t ho s e who were at the fo refront of t his movement
were David Str aus s, Bruno Bauer , LUdwi g Feuerbach an d Max
Stirner . The publ ica t i on of Das Leb en J esu by David Strauss
in 1835 intens ified 4 proc es s o f c r it i cal ana lys is o f common l y
a ccepted r e l i gious pract i ces and be l ie fs wh i ch , he r eto f o re ,
had s up po rted the poli tical and socia l order of the t i me . The
point was to expose the gospels as simply a collec tion of
11
myths; then all inherent authority which was sanctified by
these myths collapses. concomitantly, in challenging the
historical truth of the gospels, Strauss challenged the
philosophy of Hegel who was perceived by many as having
confirmed the truth o f Christianity in a philosophical
context. 12
The course of the religious debate during the period
between 1835-1845 illustrates different approachas among the
principal radical participants . n Whereas Strauss attempted
to demythologi z.e the bible he yet retained it 's essential
ethical principles. However, Bauer denuded Christianity of
any va l u e whatsoever, literally or spiritually. For Bauer, no
transc endent authority Christian or otherwise , was beyond the
ceaseless cri ticism of the human consciousness . For
Feuerbach, true to his Hegelian background, the Christian
religion was simply a phase in the development of human self-
consciousness . In finding himself man had looked beyond
himself, projecting his own idealized self in God. It was
now time to reclaim himself, give up the idea of a
transcendent being and exercise his own capacity to progress
toward an earthly heaven.
Essentially. then , the left-wing Hegelians represented an
anti-religious point of view . Eventually their sustained
criticism of conventional Christian dogma would contribute to
I ZI b i d . , p , 106 .
u 1b i d . , p , 63 .
12
the erosion of religion as the basis of society . For the
l e f t - wi n g Hegelians the erosion of Christian doqma opened the
floodgates for an entirely new range of questions regarding
human freedom and cultural reform. In their view , religious
mys tic i sm and abs t ract philosophical specula tion were s e l f-
alienating po sitions which veiled the real i s s ues of concrete
ex istence. Having dismissed the i llusion created by religion
they co uld focus on the p r a c ti c al problems of socia l a nd
poB tical r eform which a new s e nse of individual worth a nd
freedom had created .
Clearly I these t hinkers s ha r e d the conunon project of
l i be r a t i n g the human intellect from o.ny dogma whicn sustained
the illusion of a t r a nscende nt de ity . Th ey simp l y co uld not
reconc i le the i n tegri ty of the intellect ~fith the mystical
eromenee o f Christianity . Th i s was particularly true within
the context of current s c i ent i f ic progress , technological
innovation, and the t ransforma tion of consciousness t o an
ac ute awareness of s e lf-worth and ind ividual freedom . I n each
case they c learly re j e c t ed tho reality and rulersh ip of a n al l
powerful divine c reator i n fa vour of t h e co ncrete practical
dictates of the' human i nt e llec t .
For the left-wing Hegellans i n general, the goa l was a
radical r eform of the exi sting po litica l and s ocia l
structure . 14 The i r common strategy was to undermine through
14R. W. K. Paterson , The Ni hil i s t i c Egoist . London , New York,
Toronto : Oxford Uni ve r s i t y Pres s, 197 1 , p . 27.
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criticism the r el i gi ou s f ounda tion s whi c h unde r pinned t he
e xis ti ng order . But , with the publ i ca tion of Der Einz ige it
bec ame patently cle ar to h is co nt emporar i e s that Stirner wa s
not a t r ue pa rtner in their c r usade . S t i rne r was, a t on ce , a
co -conspirator a n d t hei r mos t t r enchan t criti c .
Sti rner, too , r ej ected t he s acred and the s e lf-sacri fi ce
i t demanded . But in doing so he goe s far beyond the mere
r e j e ction o f t he Go d of Christian ity . He c ategori cal l y denies
not on ly the a bstrac t c laims of a po l o gists fo r the Chr i stian
deity, bu t a l s o the equa l l y a bstrac t value s a nd princ i ples
whi ch h i s rad i cal co l l eagues were t o r escue f r om their
de struction o f tradi tional Chr i s ti a n theory . Sti r ner not only
wanted to dispense wi t h r eligion but a ll ov er ma s te ring
c oncepts whi ch the i nd ividua l wa s r equired to remain
subm i s sive . In short, St i r ne r 's s tand poi nt is not simpl y the
r ej ec t ion of a l l ob liga tions a nd dut ies, b ut also the
ens lavi ng co n cepts up on which they may be based i . e. ,
goodne s s , truth, equ i t y or l ove .
Put simpl y, Sti rner objected to any a nd all limitations
i mpos ed upo n the i ndividual. However, hi s v iew of the
i ndividual wa s not as one among many, not as on e of an
agg r eg ate of i ndiv i dua ls; but as "the one " f or whom all laws
and r e s trictions impose d were t o be regarded with sus p i c i on if
not r ej ected outright . Anything wh ich zequ Lr-ed the indi vidual
t o t ak e a s ubmissive s t a nce or r equired an obligatory loyalty
wa s s us pec t. ; be it the God o f Christianity, t he deity of the
14
State o r the divinity of Man. All social c o nve n tions wh i ch
liaited the f ree exercise o f t he un i q ue one ' s appro pria tion of
what is his own we r e to be counted as noth i ng IIlOre t han a
reflection of the pr i ma c y o f the interes ts o f t he social
col lec t i vity . Bu t , for Sti:l:ner, t he interests o f t h e 50cial
colle c tivi ty sho ul d be the l east of t he i n d i v i d ua l ' s concerns
unl es s they , coincidentl y, s erved h i s own purposes .
The f r ee dom imp lici t i n Der Einz ige is a r adical f ree dom
which s e ems t o r e j ect all conve n t i o na l thi nki ng o n t he
concept . It will be s hown tha t Stirner di smisses freedom i n
both I ts idea l a nd i ts human i sti c meani ng . Inde e d the central
q ues ti on to be r a i s e d is whethe r or n o t S tirne r is aski ng u s
t o abandon f reedom a l t oge t her . The f ol lowing- at t e mpts t o
answ e r t h i s ques tion, t a k i ng- a s its s tarting- po i nt an analysis
of wha t he means by a fixed idea.
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2 . 1 A Definition
A fixed idea is every thought , bel i e f or t r ad i tion to
which we give special reverence as a guiding pr i nc i ple in the
conduct of our l i ve s . It is a s tandpoint f r o m wh i c h we v iew
t he world , those in i t , and upon which our actions are based .
"What Is i t, then, that is called a fixed idea? An idea tha t
has s ubjected the man t o itself . " l! As such, a fi xed i de a is
a n i mpe d i me n t to the r a d i c a l i ndiv idual i sm Sti r ne r po rtrays in
Dar Einzige .
The me ani ng is c l e a r ; a n idea that i s fixed Is immutable
a nd ha s va lue in i tself, i t is more impo r tant t han t he
i ndiv idual in wh om i t is f oun d. Fixed ideas a re pa r t o f the
spirt t world according to Stirner .
Man your head i s hau nt e d ; y ou h ave
wheels in yo u r head l You i magine
grea t th i ngs. and de pic t to yo urse l f
a whol e wor ld o f Gods tha t has an
existence f o r yo u, a spirit-rea l m
t o which yo u suppose yourself t o
~~u~a li:~' h:~ei:e:~X:~a~d::~~~ons t o
I~Der Einzige, p , 43 .
l loI b i d . , p , 43 .
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So wl10 i s i t t hat ho lds t o t hese f i xed i dea s ? Th e r e ligiou s
and t he f a ithful hold t o their princip les at a ll costs
i nc luding a nd p a r ticu l a r ly a t all costs to t he mselves . Th ey
c reate a h i gher ord er to which t hey must g ive t hemse lves over;
f or se l f -sacri fice is A dominant t h eme of the r eligious .
I t Is no t j us t t he r e lig i ous i n t he formal s-ens e with
wh om Stirner t a k e s issue, bu t tho s e who wou ld g ive themselv e s
up t o any ideal , t o t r u t h , l ove , hu mani ty o r the s ta te. Al l
t hose who believe in i d e a s or causes which a re c ha racterized
by se l f lessness are e s s e n t i a l l y r el ig i ous ; in short , a lmost
everyone . From Stirner' 5 standpoint there is ha r dly a ny
d istinc tion to be made a mong t he intellectual, pol itical o r
Soc ial zealots o f h is time . All a re essentially r eli g i ous an d
a l l are guil ty of d i sp osse s sing themselves in a most wasteful
Sti rner makes i t qu ite clea r t ha t t o g i ve onesel f
ove r to a fixed idea is no t hing more t ha n an exercise in self-
deniaL Bu t on ly a fool wc u Id deny himself a nd St i r ner takes
time t o emphas ize th i s poi nt .
Do not think t ha t I am j e s ting or
speaki ng fi guratively when I r e gard
thos e pers on s who cling t o t h e Highe r,
and (because t he vast ma jori t y b e l ongs
under t his he a d) a l most t he whole world
~fm:~~~u:: . Y7e r itabl e f oo ls, fools i n
mad hou s e i t h i s i s how Sti rne r d isd a i nfully
chara cteri ze s a world too l ong oc cupi ed wi t h caus e s i . e , , wi th
giving oneself up for one a bstrac t i dea or ano ther . But , jus t
17I b i d . , p , 43.
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as re ligion I s an example of fixed i deas In general , idealism
is nothing more tha n r el i g i o n expressed in a phi l osophic
context .
2.2 Idealism
Modern philosophy was dominated by ph i losophica l systems
which established reason as the unconditional a p r iori o f all
knowl edge and action. Ran t, f or e xamp l e , made reeson , howeve r
limited, the su preme basiS of a mo ral im perative to which
huma n ac t ion in the worl d is to be conformed . Reason r e quire s
of man that he t a ke responsibil ity for his moral behaviou r
Lve , that he take respons ibili t y for his f r e ed om. Any
conflict between duty and des i re was to be r e s olve d beyond t he
real m of mere s ens e and a lways i n favour of duty . Fr e e dom i s
thu s d irectly linked to r e a s on and man ' 5 ob ligation to temper
and control h is pa s s i onate inclinations .
I n Hegel , also, t here is a di rect l i nk be tw e en freedom
a nd r eason . The who le pro ce s s o f kn owi ng something i . e , , the
g iven appe a r a nc e and t he subject 's act o f a pp rehend i ng It,
belongs to a :si ng le r elation of reason ; a r ela t i on b etwee n i ts
own s ubjective and objective forms . Re a s on , by i t s own
i n t e r na l log ic, pr oc lai ms i ts own be ing-for-s elf ou t of whi ch
and t hroug h which free dom is po s s i ble . I t i s t h is same
i n t e r na l log i c by whi ch freedom o f s e l f - c on s c i ou s n e s s
deve lop on ly in opposition i . e ., through the de ma nd s f or
reci p r ocity o f oth e r fr ee se l f-consc ious beings .
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In fac t the con ce pt o f f reedolll ha s meaning on l y I n s o fa r
as i t ha s t h i s op pos i t i on wi thou t wbi c b, a ccor d i n g t o He ge l.
f reedom ha s no co ntent . I t s conte nt is g i ve n a s a 9'0a 1 t o be
a chieved by the r a t ional s u b ject i n an ordered s o cie t y . Bu t
S t i r n e r a rgue s t hat i f r eason prevail s t h e n mi n d is ra ise d
ab ove us , It be comes some t hing mor e t ha n us. As s uch we
b e come ca p t i ves o f t he egoism of t hough t i .e . . we be come
p o s sessed by ",ind . Ac c o r dingly , f a ith a n d b '!1ief in spi r it or
mind deman d s tha t we g i ve ours elve s over t o a higher o r de r.
a bdica t e our fl e sh a nd blood earthly d e s ire s. " Bu t thinking
a nd though t s are no t s a c r e d t o me , a nd I defend my sk i n
a ga i n s t them as a gains t othe r things . ,,' . He n c e " . .. 1 f
thoughts a re f r e e I 4111 the ir s l ave . " ·' In othe r wo r d s , whe n
thought s a r e c on crete ly exp r essed in the f orm o f a cause o r a n
idea l , they take o n a cer ta i n a u t hors hip of t h e ir o wn i n wh i ch
the indi v i dual in wh om they are f ound be c ome s q ui t e po we rles s .
For example whe n one is d uty b o u nd i n f a vou r of som e
n a t ionalistic i d eal , one is qu i t e p r e par e d t o g ive u p a ll
se l f -interests i n de fe rence t o it.
And what ha s r e a son a n d the Enligh t e nment b r o u ght t o t he
political s phere ? According t o S t i r n e r a n ew master , a new
fi xed idea in ebe form of the nation s t a t e . The Fren ch
r e vo l u t i on populari zed , i f not invented , the e xp r es s i o n " go od
c i t i z e n ". And what i s a good c i ti zen? One who giv e s hims e lf
I- Ibid . , p , 14 9 .
l'I bid . • p . 34 5 .
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up , who sacrifices himself in the i n t.erests of fraternal
unity , i n the intere sts of the state . An ind i v idual ' s value
under s tat ehood i s measured in terms of his va l ue to the
state . While t he sta te may r epres ent a free and equal
assoc i ation of ind i viduals , all rights and pr i vileges rest
with and a r e granted at the state 's d i scretion . Therefore the
state' s goals a re s e l f -servi ng , ego i sti c ; it insists upon a
r ational order , a moral behavior. a limi ted fre edom . 20
The political liberty of a s tat e so guided by reason and
a moral co de must i n s i st on t h e i ndivid u al's s ubj ugatio n to
the s t a te i .e. , there must be a certain fo rfeiture of
individual fre edom. Paradoxically , i n the name of freedom,
the i nd ivi dua l i s a sk ed to give it up. Consequently ,
poli t ical freedom does not mean the subject can choose to be
s t a t el ess; it does not allow t he subjec t 's independence from
t he s ta t e , its constitution or its l aws . On the contrary,
s ay s Stirner , the sta te is sacred and i ts ex c l us ive concern i s
with itself. Therefore only the state is free s i nc e it has
the power, hence the righ t according to 5tirner, to use all
mean s neces sary to insure its continued existence and
s tabili t y.
Hencef or th only the lordship of the
state , i s admitted ; personally no one
is any longer the Lord of another .
~~:ns~:t:~flth the children belong to
ZOI b i d . , p . l OS.
"rs re. , p . 109 .
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Th is oppr e ssion, und e r the gu ise of fre edom, is what the
French r e vol uti o n an d s u bseq u en t po li tical l i beral ism has
f o i s t e d upon the s o l i t a ry individua l with who m Stirner
i d e n t ifi <-s . S ti r n e r wanted particu l a r ly to e xpose t h e the s is
of l iberal hum ...n ism. the standpo i nt of his r adi c a l
co n tempo rarie s who thought they had c ve rc oa e ph ilos ophy .
religion a nd t h e s tate through the id ea of f r ee dom. A t he s i s
which St i rner r ega r ded as j us t one more fi xed i dea .
2.3 Humanism
Feue r bach was a leading f igure i n t he trans f orma t ion of
German i de a lism and the myst ical ele ments of Christiani t y i nto
the hwnan i s lIl and philos oph y o f "pra xi s " wh ich wa s to bec ome
thematic i n subseque n t 19th century thought . He rail ed
a gains t idea lis lIl as a fo rm of s e l f - a li enat ion , an ou t o f bod y
a b s t r a c t i on wh ich focus ed on thought bu t had fo r gotten that
whi c h t h inks . I de alis m a bs t r ac ts the human f unc t ion of r e a s on
from i ts f l es h and blood host making r eason a sel f -sus t a inin g,
i nde pende n t entity . J us t s o, Chr i s ti a n i ty a bs t r a c ts ideal
ve r s i ons of huma n chara cteristics an d projec t s them i nto the
infinite b e i ng o f God. But for Feu erba ch :
The divi ne be ing i s nothing e lse t han
t he h uman being or , r a t he r, t h e human
nature pu r i fi e d, freed f rom t he limits
of the i ndiv idual ma n , made ob j e ctive
- L e . , cont e mplated a nd r evered as
anothe r , a d i stinct b eing . All t he
2 1
attri butes »t the d ivine n a t ur e are ,
~=~~;~~f.e, a t 'tribu t e s of t h e hu ma n
And f urther:
Cons ciousn e s s o f God i s s elf-
consc i ou sne s s, knowledge of God i s
self-knowl edge . By his God thou
~:~;e~~e t~:om:~; ~~=n~rc:~~uftlan his
Human ism i s, t h.ere f or e, a re so l ve ec begin with man as
the source a nd sanc tion o f a l l that Is good an d cr ea tive in
th e world . Man i s the ::':' ?Te me b£::lng and t he fu 'ture n oth i ng
else but a. function of man's pract i c a l re lat ions hi p to na ture
a nd hi s f ellow man . Man's life in a. re l i gious cont ext I s &
cont i n ua l s t r ugg le t o overcome tha t which was a ssigned to him
f rom birth i. e ., h is or i gina l sin . Rather, for Feue r bach, man
II1USt rec laim t ha t whi ch was h is a l l along ; the f r e e d o m to
exp lore and de velop h is own divin e nature and h i s own
i mmortality ; not i autlorto!. l i ty in t he s ense of a persona l life
at t e r death but, t hr ough the eternal r easo n of t he species ,
t he i mmorta l sp iritual l ite o f hunan ity.
He r e Fe uerbach and St i rner pa r t ways in a mos t abrupt and
de cisive mann er , Contrary t o t he eter na l r e as on o f t he
s pe c i e s and the fra t erna l uni t y of man , Stirner present s t he
so li tar y tlgure o f one who faces h i s mort ality wi t h what se ems
22Ludwi g Feuerbach , The Es se nce of Chri st i a nity . translated
f r om t he German by George Ellio t . New Yor k : Harper a nd Row, 195 7 ,
p , 14.
2J 1b i d . , P . 12.
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t o be an enthusiastic declaration and acceptance o f hi s
"creative no thingness " .
All predicates of ob jects a re my
statements, my j udgements , my-creatures .
If they want to tear the ms e l ve s l oos e
from me and be some thing for themse lves ,
o r actual ly overawe me , t hen I have
no thi n g mor e p ressi ng t o d o t h a n to take
;~e~h~a~~e;~~~.},heir nothing , i nto
And a li t t le further :
For me there is no truth for noth i ng is
more t ha n I I Not even my essence , not
even t he essence of Ma n , is more t han I I
~~~~i~~ii~~:n~d~:~" i~ t he bu cket," t his
S tirner v i e ws Fe uerbach 's criticism of ideal i sm and h i s
shift from Christ iani ty t o humanism a s a l a t e r a l move at best
which provides no es s e n ti a l change in the status of t he
individual. The i ndividual is still obliged t o love , obey and
contribute t o t he social co llectiVi ty . The Essence of
Chr istiani t y of f ers ample evidence f or St i rner's cont e n tion
tha t Feuerb a ch ' s humanism i s profoundly religious and thus
anathema to the individual. "Man h a s his highest be ing , his
God , in h i ms elf; no t in himself as an individual, but i n hi s
essential nature, hi s species . ,,2 6 Clearly Fe uerbach ha s
simply f ramed t h e old r elig i ous order i n new t erms and
expressed the result as a ntow religion, the re ligion of
240e r Eiodge, p , 337 .
;2'Ibid., p. 35 5 .
"zeeence of Christ ianii.:y, .Q.E: . cit . , ap pe ndi x 1 .
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h uma n i sm . Th e a bs olute 1s no w h u man nature itse l f with love
as a g uiding princ i p le .
Feuerbach, t rue to his Hegelian r oot s, gi ve s credi t to
Christianity as h a v i n g been a n e c e s s a r y s tage in the
development o f self-consc iousness a n d personality. But it was
a t ransitory s tage i n which the limi t s and defects of man are
overcome by f a i t h . Ra the r , for Fe uerbac h, an objectified
d ivine spirit i . e . , t he consciousness of God, is nothing more
t han the consciousness o f the species . Human i sm, then,
remains sacred according to Stirner since :
Howe ver human this sacred t h ing nlay
l o ok , though it be the hu ma n i t s e l f ,
that does not take away its s acredness,
but a t most changes i t f rom an unearth l y
~~ea~oe:r~~~~n~~cred thing , f ro m a divine
Feuerbach, a long wi t h his no table contemporaries St rauss
and Bauer ha d s tar ted a proces s o f calling t he nature o f man
into ques t ion . I deal i zed hu man characteristics were rec laimed
by the very c reature who had given the m up i n t he fi rst place ;
the creature who, in do i ng so , ha d given up h i s f r e edo m.
Implicit in a ll this is t hat f or Feuerbach freedom invo lves
firstly , a rejection o f an y i deologi cal and r eligious control
over ma n and, secondly , a long ing t.o be free f rom the l i mi t s
and defects of hi s individua lity . 28 But fo r Stirner, itA
pecpLe canno t b e free otherwise t han at t he individua l 's
27 0er Einzige, P . 36 .
28Es s e nc e o f Chri s t i an i t y. £2 . c it . , ap pen d i x 1 .
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expense; for it is not t h e i nd i vid u a l that is t he main poin t
in this liberty , bu t the people. "a
The age o f reason and enl ightenment whi l e seemi n g to
libe r ate man I s co nsc iousness and revea l hi s potentia l freedom,
h a d on ly succeeded i n providing a host of new self-alienating
a nd i ntrans i gent i d eas whi ch, in f ac t , limited freedom
according to Stirner . To the un i qu e i nd i v i dua l these ideas o r
causes , i n wh a t e ver form they t ook , were anathema to the
spontaneous d i cta t e s of one who refused to give h im s e l f u p to
any en trenched and stat ic idea o r cause .
To Stirner, not only were ideal ism a nd humanis m
essentially religious and t hus to be r e j ecte d , bu t s o was t he
idea of f reedom in whos e na me they had been ad vanced also t o
be r e j e c t ed as j ust one more a bs traction, another fixed idea .
2\1ne r Einzlge , P . 214.
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CHAPTER 3 :~
3 . 1 Freedom 8 5 Abstract
Freedom i s a d i f f icult and e lus ive concept co ns t a nt ly
be i ng r e d e fi ne d i n the ligh t of c hanges in man I s social a nd
po l i t i c a l environme n t and h i s perc e p t i o n o f h i ms e lf a n d
nature . I n t he p resent t i me f reedom, an d t he val ue j Udgements
which invariably attend this co ncept, is an unavoida b le i s s u e
whi ch g ives uni ty t o a myriad of diverse co ntemporary
problems . ~c The direct roots o f t he mo dern inclination t o
r eg a r d al l value jUdgements as somehow a pu rely pe r so nal
mat ter, are t raceable to t he ri s e in individua l self-conscious
awareness an d t he co nv iction tha t f reedom an d progress were
exclusively a matter fo r human ac t ion.
This conviction was t o manifest i tse l f i n va rious social
and political t h eorie s Jl whic h were t o present a pe cul i arly
di f ficu l t problftm fo r governments and society alike. The
problem was, ho w bes t to d e f i ne and encourage a sense of
i nd i vi du a l liber t y and . a t the sa me time, pre s erve order and
lOFor example , abortion , ge n e t ic r e s earch and e nv i ronmental
issues all, i n one way or a no t her, i nvolve va l u e judgements and t he
extent t o wh i c h we are fre e to determi ne the pr e s en t an d f utur e
r e s pec t ing ourse lves , others an d natur e .
J1Examples : Humani s m (Feu erbach ) , Ana r chism (pr ou dho n l,
Socialism (Marx) .
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purpose in society withi n a f ramework of c ommon l y accepted
moral and social norms . This i s the underlying i s s ue with
which the l eft-wing Hegelians were engaged , albeit on a
theoretical l evel, and out o f which thei r r a d i c al v iews were
formed. The ent i r e s pect r um o f s oc i e ta l r elationships to s o me
important degree then , a s now, c ent r es on this is s ue .
The negati ve approach to the concept of freedom en tails
the absence o f coercion . I t de scribes a condition whereby a n
individual I s not preve nted by an e xter n a l au t hor i t y from
choos ing h i s own course o f a ctio n. An i ndividual Is fre e to
the ex tent that he i s not co mpe l led to act otherwise than he
wi shes . This i s freedo m de fined in a rathe r na r row s ens e a nd
is commonly r e ferred to as "freedom f rom".
The sc op e of the definition of freedom ca n be broaden ed
in a t lea s t two s i g n i fica n t ways . The first wou ld i nc l ud e t he
ab sence of nat ur a l co ndi tions which wou ld ob struc t the
i ndividual from ac ting as he wishe s . In a ver y r eal sense
t h is has been a c easeless goal of man , to bring nature under
c ontrol i . e , . , to overcome i t. Second, i t is argued that
f reedom i s only s ubstant i ve if an i ndividual ha s the me a ns
a c t ua l l y to achieve that which he de sire s o f his own vo l i tion
I. e ., the power to contro l hi s present and future i n a
po sitive and dynami c way . Associated with thi s is an element
of spont ane i t y ; action which i s initiated fo r no par t i c u l a r
p urpose and which mayor may not be grounded in some code of
ethics : we just simply a ct in a given way because it occurs
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to us t o do s o . Thi s sense of freedom Is referred to
"freedom to", a c t i on grounded only i n the agent's ab ility and
resources with no particul ar restraints of co nsc ience .
Free dom, then , to the extent that we do or do not ha ve it
c a n be re la t ed to t hree general i s sues . Th e absence of
coe rc ive huma n agents and the ir institutions, the absence of
natural barriers a nd , the individual ' s abil ity and r e so urces
t o ac t s pon taneous l y with r e gard only for the acting ag ent ' s
d es ires of the moment .
The degree to which coercion i s l eI t a nd the r e sponse o f
those subject to it i s a function of t he poll tical and
s oc ietal matrix within whi ch it is used . For exam ple , a state
in which the press, literature and public a s sembly are
directly controlled by the state, will e xhib i t a c onc omi t a nt
con t r ol over public op i n i on , ed uc ation and poli tical
opposition . Given that this sy stem is well e n t renc hed there
may not be a significant sense o f limitation felt by its
citizens . I ts c itizenry may become de s ensitiz ed by a
poli tical and social order whi ch pe rmi ts the ve r y direct
manipulation o f da ily life i n what is called a closed soc i ety .
A more s ubt l e kind of c oer c ion , but not necessarily less
debilitating , c an exist in an open society . This kind of
so c ie t y i s s ome t i mes ch aracteri zed by a n inordinant emphas i s
on the compe t i t i v e s p i r i t of man. Freedom to compete is a
dominant theme motivated by the conviction that freedom and
material status are identical . Usually the mechanisms devoted
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to influencing public opinion and decision making are h ighly
sophisticated and powerful . These mechanisms are not
dedicated exclusively to commercial issues ; but may also
influence to an extraordinary extent other important decisions
of a political and moral nature . The po i n t is that coercion
cuts across all political and cultural sphere s and is no t jus t
a ma tter of heavy-handed int r usio n s wh ich limit an
individual's freedom .
In so far as freedom requires the absence of coercion,
the German revolutionaries of the mid-nineteenth century
presented a seri o u s challenge to the old or d e r whose s ecu r i ty
r ested on their power-s of coercion . Heretofore, religion had
been the bas is of moral standards a nd a r e f e r e nc e f or man ' s
mode of conduct . Man was to obey or risk retribution a s
severe as eternal damnation . Rel igion, therefore , was used a s
a coercive weapon to control the individual a s much in this
life as in the promised rewards of the next.
These revolutionaries were determined to be free from the
mystical messages of Chr i s t i a n i t y and its coercive authority .
They proposed in its place the self-determining man who , as
the centre and sanction of all that is , establishes h ims elf as
the sole arbiter of his future and the values upon which that
future is to be based . Feuerbach said :
The absolute to Man i s his own nature .
i~:r~~:~~ ~~et~~w~~j~~th~;e~~i~at~re . J1
"aesenee of Christianity, 2,2. c it" p . S.
2'
The humanh'tic project, therefore, consists primar ily i n '"
redefinition o f fr e edom ou ts ide a traditional r e lig i o us
conte xt . Humani slII declares a l l forms of the supernatural as
a n abdicati on o f man' s own div ine potential : t he a lienation o f
his creative abili ty to solve his own prob lems I n t h e here An d
now of this e a r t h ly exper ience. Also, humani s t i c e thics
grounds all v a l ue j udgements s o l e l y i n h uma n inter personal
r e l a tionsh i ps . As such , man takes con t ro l of his future and
the r espons i b ility f o r t he va l ue jUd gements behind hi s
decis io ns i .e., h e takes re sp on s i b i li t y for hi s fr e e d om.
Freedom , so described, is pu re ly a matter f or human ac tion and
no t contingent on any t riba l or divine codes .
To St :tr ne r this project is fine so f ar a s it goes bu t it
do e s not go far e no ugh. He charged tha t Feuerbach , in ho l d i ng
that t he firs t and h ighest law mus t be t he love of man to man,
reta ined a ba s i c tenet of Chr i stian ethics . For Stirner this
is no more than an o t h e r fixed idea; me n lIust now revere each
other instead of God. No doubt h is radical c ontemporaries
were a l l atheists but atheism does not p reclude spiritualism .
Nei t he r i s mor ality an exclusive f unc tion o f t he i s m. Stlrner
co n tends that liberal h uman i sm , in ge neral, ma i ntains
s piri t ua li ty a nd mora lity i n ne w f orm s i . e . , the s tate ,
soc i e t y, a nd hu ma ni t y. Thes e i deals , acco r d i ng t o Sti r ner ,
maintain t hat protean h i era r c hy wh ich h i sto r y shows has only
served to dominate and control t he i nd ividual a nd, i n so
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doing , serve thems elve s . St irner' s response i s c a t e gori ca lly
c l ear.
Let rae t h en lIkewise concern mysel f f or
mysel f, who am equal ly with God t h e n o t h i n g
:~l;l~n:~~trs . who am my all , who lira the
Hence, Stirner c onc l ud e s t hat the liberal -humanists
re l e gat e the s ta t us o f the i nd i vidua l to tha t of se rvant t o a
highe r order . Unde r the God o f Huma n ! ty fre e d om remains an
a bs t r ac tion . Th e fr e edo m off ere d i s ecli p sed by the s hado w of
its own c r eator , a partia l freedom de void o f c on t en t .
Of what use Is f reedom to y o u, indeed
if it bri ng s i n noth i ng? And if you
became free f rom everyt hing. yo u wou l d
no longer h ave anyth ini' fo r f reedom
i s empty of subs tan ce .
And f urther :
To be fre e i s sone thi ng that I c annot
truly wil l , because I cannot make it .
cannot create i t : I can o'1ly wi s h it
:~di~::~r: :;::~l!ti t , f or it r e mai ns
Thi s all po ints t o a f undamental problem . Any kind o f
collectivist political sy stem ha s at i ts r oot a built-in
c ontradic tion I.e • • i t sets up i t s own i n terna l oppos i tion .
On t he one ha nd t here a re the indi v i du a l s who c omprise the
c o llect ivi t y and whose freedom as indi v i dua l s i s often a
pr imary go al. On the o t he r is the c o llec t ivity its el f taken
" nee Ei n zige . p . S .
l f 1b i d • • p , 156 .
J~ Ibid ., p . 157.
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as a who l e wh i c h wa n t s to organ ize its members and t he
totality o f its r esources towa rds a single aim or pur pose .
This i s t he f o c us of the conflict which arises whe n i nd i v i du al
in t e r e s t s i .e . , s e l f - i n t e r e s t s , a re subIa ted I n favour of the
ama lgam proposed , for example , by a socialist society .
The s tate, especially t he fo r m of it proposed by the
soc.te f t e e s , represents just t ha t sense of freedom against
which Stirner i nve ighed so vehement Iy , I t represents, in
wha t e ver form i t may a ppear , j ust t hat stultifying commona lity
so contrary to Stirner 's unique i ndividual. Each citizen may
be free to t h e extent that the state wi ll n ot pe rmit the
capricious ac tion of on e individua l against a no t he r. But , all
sanctions reside within t he pur vi ew o f the s t a t e ; therefore
the s tate co ntrols al l coercive authority . Hence, while a
constitu tional l y gua ranteed state may give a sense o f f r e e dom
to the people as a social co llectivity, i t does s o only a t t he
expense of the indi vidual says Stirner.
Wha t is the me an i ng of the doctri ne
that we all en joy "equ ality o f
po litical r i ght s ? " on ly t h i s - - -
that the state has no rega r d f or my
person, that t o it I , like eve ry
other, am o nly a man, wi t hout haVi n g
ano t her s i gnificance t hat c ommands
i ts deference. 36
Equa lity of politi cal rights only means t ha t everyone may
part ake of a ll the rights the state ha s t o give so long as t he
attending conditions are met I .e ., all state laws are g iven
l 6 I b i d . , P . 102.
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due respect. Th i s is prec isely the partial freedom that
Stirner vi e we d as a n a bs t r a c t i o n bec a us e it brings i n nothing .
Fr eedom 5Ilus t be c omplet e and unre served , t herefore , i t c annot
b e granted because t h e mome n t the gi f t 15 ac cepted t h e
i ndividual must a lso a c c e pt t he po we r a nd a ....t.ho r l t y o f t h e
grantor . To t he qu estion of the rela tions hip between fre edom
and pow er we s ha l l r eturn .
I n any even t, s o c ia l liberty do e s no t ne ces sarily attend
po litical l iber ty . Th e issues of clas s s t r u c t u r e, property
and t he s ys t em of d i s t ribut i on o f s ca r ce means , a l l bea r upo n
the extent to wh i ch a n i ndividua l i s f r ee withi n a given
pol itical s t r uc t ure. Karl Marx de scribed a s ociety in whi ch
e a c h individual has a responsibility to the s ocial
collectivity . Inordinate ac cumulations of weal t h c on t r ad i c t
this r e s pons i bil i t y i n that it provo kes a n econo mic and s oc i al
imbalance; a s a c ons eq uence i t crea t es i ns tabi l i t y . Therefor e
s oc i a l ism imp oses an obligation on everyone to acqui re t o t he
extent o f their ne ed s and on the s t r e ngt h of their labour so
long a s the overa ll effect con t r i but es to the progress o f
so ciety a s a whole .
In Stirne r 's v i ew socialism takes away
dis tinc tivene ss a s individuals , it makes us homo gen o us and i t
makes freedom a function of social a nd e ce ne mxc principles .
Therefore, t he human i st i c i dea of l ove and t he s oc ialistic
principle o f mutua l obligation a r e precisely the princ i p les of
s e l f-sa c r if i c e which Stirner abhors .
characteri zed the socia l ist 's out look.
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This I s how he
We are freehorn men, and wherever we
look we see ourselves made s e rv an t s
of egoists I Are we then to be come
egoists t oo! Heaven forbid! We want
r ather t o make egoists impo s sible I
We want to make them a ll "ragamuffi ns ";
~~ i lO~a~Sh:~:~ . 1;t,av e nothing. that
And further :
Let us do away with personal prO;lerty ,
let e veryone be a ragamuffin . Let
~~o~~:t~o~~e~;~~8rsonal,let i t be l ong
St i r ner sees the abras i ve intellectua l d i s c ou r s e o f h is
t ime a s a s t r ugg l e between l i beral and con s ervative e l e me n ts
both of who m ha ve the same objective L e ., freedom of s piri t .
This freedom of spiri t is to be achi eved in either t he city of
God or the city of Man but in both c ase s t he spirit reigns
s upr eme. "The spirit remai ns the ab solute lord for both, and
their only quarrel i s over who shall occupy the hierarchical
throne . . . " J9
And f urther, with a tone of finality and detachment
r especting thi s struggle he s ay s:
The best of it i s that one can calmly
look upon t he stir with the certainty
that the wild beasts of history will
" nsre , , P . 116 .
lIlI bid. , P. 117 .
lllI b i d . , p , 64.
J4
In p r e v i o u s times the wa t c h word was " s ervice" . Serve the
f e u d a l lord and he will protect y ou, s erve God and He will
redeem you, on ly s e rve an d i t wil l b e r e corded; put on deposit
to your c r ed i t. The de eds o f you r s e rv ice will be he ld i n
t rus t, o n ly trust an d s erve . According t u S t i r ne r thi s wa s
the ethic of spi ritual f ree dom . The de s erving man, the
s e r v a n t, will be rewarded with fre e d om, we are n o t born free
we ear n it .
I n s e r vice and obedience t o society and t he s t a t e f reedom
wa s , a t l a s t , made concrete. Humanity in s ocie t a l f o r m had at
l a s t reclaimed f ree do m for i tself , brouqht i t back do wn t o
earth and dep osited it in the s tate for a ll t o partake of in
eq ua l aeasure ,
All of which 15 nothing b u t II. grotesque a bs t r ar.:t i o n , say s
Stirner . As be nign SUbj ects we r emain c apt ives of the
objec tive s pir i t of humanity an d the s tate , two overmastering
ideals grou nded in the obj e c t i v i t y of thought . Howev e r , the se
ideals e x i st on ly i n so f a r as the i ndi v idua l allows them to ,
and t he fre edom they o f f er is c oncocted, c ons t i t u t i ona l , i t is
c ha rtered fre ed om. The s t a te r emains s acr ed and offers a
limi ted freed om wi thi n the framewor k o f its co ns ti t u tiona l
d ic t a te s . In o ther wor d s , the s tat e r e s erve s an esca pe clau se
permit ting fre e d om only t o t he ex tent t ha t i t s own c ontinuance
40I b i d . , P . 64 .
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is not threatened. Stirner makes t h is very p owerf ul co mmen t
wi t h r e spe c t t o l i mi t e d o r charte red fre edom:
In t heir s I yne s s t he y k now wel l tha t
given (c hartered) freedo m is no fre edom,
s i n c e on ly t he fre edom one t ak e s f c.r
himself, there fore the egoist 's freedom ,
rides wi t h fu ll sails . Donated freedom
strikes i t s sails as soon as there comes
a stor m. U
Stirne r is not trying t o formu late a new s ys tem of
intrinsic or constitut iona l social values upon which to base
a ne w vi s i on of f reedom. It be c omes increas ingly c lear t hat
he was no t only wI ll i ng to chal lenge tradi t i onal Christia n
mor a li t y but the v al i di t y of moral ity i t s e lf . He contends
t hat f r e e d om i s not possible if c onditioned by mor al! t y by t he
very fact t hat mor al ity g a cond i tion . Hi s is a p r o jec t of
ove r coming moral i ty i t s elf since , by h i s view, f reedom i s
undefina b l e a nd unlimited. The r e is no do ub t a t t his p o i nt
that Stirner has li t t l e regar d for humanistic a nd socialis tic
ideals and t he f r ee dom in whos e name t he y were advanced . But
t he question arises as to whether he i s a s k i ng us t o abandon
freedom a ltogether, no t j us t freedom as a liberal - humanist
fixed Idee but freedom as s uch . There is s ome ambi gui ty i n
Der Einzige respecting t his i s s u e a nd it i s thi s t hat
subsequent chapters wi ll ad dress. But fi r st, s ince Stirner
" rsra ., P . 167 . With Stirner ' 5 po i nt ed comment he re on e i s
i mmedia t e l y reminded of severa l conte mpor a ry e xamples . The FLQ
crisis in Quebe c in 197 0 i s one s uch ca s e . The dec laration o f t h e
War Measures Act and the s ubs eque n t suspension of common l y accepted
libert ies, gi ve s so me credibi lity t o St i rner 's argume nt .
3.
ha s often b e e n l i n k ed t o t h e anarchist trad i t ion , U i t m19ht
be u seful t o l oo k tt t t h e s e nse of fr e e d orll pecul i ar t o
anarchism and s ee ho w, i f at a l l , i t Is c ompatible wi t h
St i rner 's r ad i c a l ind i v i d ual i s l'l.
3 . 2 Anarchi stic Freedom
The s pirit a nd t he mode of all l1 bertar i a n political a n d
s o c i a l i de a ls have not always s hown a r igid un i f o rm i t y o f
s t r uc t ure and pur po s e , One s u c h di s t inct ive form of
lib e r t a r i anism is that defined by the anar ch is t t r a d i tion .
Anar -:h i s m insists on a c omplete r e j ec t i on o f all forms of
au tho ri ty. I t i s t he on e inf lex ibl e p remi se on whic h t here is
no c ompr omi s e and wh ich q1\o e 5 t he t heory uni ty wi t hin 1 t s own
va r iat i ons . This prellis e , along with an apparen t assoc iation
wi th some lat te r day v i ol en t e xtremists , has not serve d
ana r c hy well i n i t s pop ularity as a social an d polit i cal
theory . The t erm i s ge ne r ii.l l y us e d i n It pejorat i ve sense bu t
of ten for t he wro ng r e a s ons .
A s ta te is the e mbodi me nt of government and l aw wi t h its
attending c oer c i ve au thor i t y . As coercive, t he anarchis t
bel i e ve s i t should not exis t if true ind i vidual fre ed om i s to
be ac hieved . The anar ch is t s offer i n i ts place the
UExa mples; G. Woodc ock, V. Basch, B.R . Tuck e r. (See R.W.K .
Pa t erson, ~ c it . pp , 126-144 .)
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provocative idea of 4 f ree a s sociat i on of i nd i vi dua ls in a
societ.y gov e rned on ly on t he basi s of indivi du a l mu t ua l
cons e n t . The cas e for a. s ociety fre e f ro,. l a w a n d government,
while s t il l r e garded by mos t as na i ve and po t entially chaotic ,
h a s h u ge i mp li c a tio n s for the concept of freedorl and ,
ther efore, merits s ome co nside r ation as a intellectually
sign i fi c ant socia l and political the ory .
The three mai n proponent s of a narc h ism i n the ni nete e nth
c entury were P i err e J os e p h Proud hon , Mikha i l Baku n! n a nd Peter
Kropotkin . Th ei r s oc ia l t he or y res t s on t he co mmon ground o f
a s oc i e t y f ree o f gove r n me n t. Th e s ocie t y they en visioned is
mar ked by a v o lun t ary s p i r i t of coopera tion among individual s
who a re r a t i onal and ha ve a d ee p sense of moral values.
Anarchi s t s a re no t a nt i -social . r ather. t hey are a nti -
a uthoritarian . Th e y seek a co mmunity i n whi ch social order i s
main tained t h rough rea soned arguments &lIong cooperative and
e nligh tened free ind i vidu a ls . I f nothing else anarchi sm is a n
o ptimi s tic t heo ry o f hUlllan natur e . To expect a group of
i nd i v i dual s t o c oa l e sce i n a s oc ie t y free of any r igidly
s tructured lega l system and succes sfully prtJduce a peacefu l
a nd progre ss ive community Is . by any a ccount. op timistic .
Among i t s t hree maj or p r opon ent s t he r e were some
differenc e s i n ap proach t o s oc ie ty and the fre edom defining
i t s s t r uc t u r e . Proudhon proposed a reformation o f socie ty
co mmi t t ed t o a working class f ra terni ty . Howeve r . violence
wa s dislll.iss ed as a p r inciple i n achie ving the necessary s oc i a l
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r eform . He p roposed a cooperative s oc ie t y of indep endent
equals opp osed to monopolistic i ndustrial a gen ts and to t he
principles of private property . Property , i n terms of land
for example , s hould be held by e k ind of prov i s iona l owner
whose sale Mo t iva t i on i n h o lding the prope rty was t o produce
the goods he need ed t o live . Thi s provis i onal ownership,
f irstly , permits the sens e of freedom a nd i nde pe nde nce that
anarchy demands a nd, second ly, prev ents the pos s ib le
ex p l oi tation of l a b o u r by those who might otherwise a c cu mu l ate
h uge a mounts o f wea lth .
Bakun!n di f f e red f rom Proudhon In two s i gn i f i c an t ways .
First. he was not a ve rse t o us ing viol e n c e in t he promotion of
his i deas and , sec ond , he was more i n c l i ned to be l i eve that
the means of prOduction should be pu bl icly owned . Th i s might
seem to place hi.. near Marxism on the po li t i cal s pe c t rum but
Bakunin and Marx were polar opposites politically . Harxi s lIl
advoca tes proletari an control in the f o rmati on of a new sta t e
e ven though this new state s houl d e ven t ua lly d isap pear .
Bakunin v i ewe d thi s new stat e, no mat t er how t r a ns i t ory , as
nothing more than a new poli tical power structure with t he
same pote nt i a l for corruption , in new hands . U
In contrast to St irner 's anti-socia l s tance, Pe te r
Kro po t k i n ex horts men to an acti ve pa r ti c ipa t i on in so c i e ty
be liev ing, as h e did, that onl y in so ciety was complete 5e l£ -
U G. P . Maximoff , Bakunin . London : Collier, MacMillan Lindted ,
19 5 3 , p. 2 2 4 .
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development p os s ible . Th e e thical f or mula he presen ts
const ituting the necessar y co nd i t ion f or a harmonious societ y
whi ch would fos ter freed om and s e lf-de ve lopment i s a s f olloW5 :
"Wi thout e quity there is no j us tice, a nd withou t j ustice there
i s n o morality ."u Cl e a rly t hen , t h e anarch y wh i c h Kropotki n
depicts and the sense of fre edom so central t o it , are
condi tioned b y eq~ity, justice a nd morali t y . However , he
ca utiously tempers h i s view as f ol l ows.
A most im por t a nt co nd ition whi c h a
mode rn e thica l system is b ound t o
satisfy is that it must not f etter
i nd ividu a l ini tiati v e s , b e it. f o r
~~eh~~~~n~~~i~~eo~s t~:es;:~i:~~.~o f
I n h i s de fense of individua l i nitiative and,
co ncomitantly, his insis tence on an e thical co de upon whi ch
f reedom may be cul tiva ted , Kro potkin r e co gn i z e s the
f un damental contradiction which a rises ou t o f t he concept o f
conununal individual ity . His so lution to this co nt rad ict ion is
bas ed on a b e lief in t he t herapeutic and me d i ating effects o f
mutual a id , j us tic e an d mora lity .
It is not so import an t that t he de tails o f an anarchistic
s oc i a l and political sys tem be r ev i ewed here as i t is t o
unde r stand the basic principles whi ch und e rl i e the socia l
arrange ment whi ch i t propose s ; t hi s wi t h a v i ew to contras ting
"Peter Kropotkin , Ethi cs . Tr anslated by Lou i s S . Fri edlan d and
J oseph R. Pi roshni ko f f . New York , Lond on : Ben jami n Bl om, 196 8, p ,
xv .
· ~Ibid ., P . 27.
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the sense of freedom aris ing out of their ideas with those of
Stirner . There are three genera l observations that can be
made with r e s pe ct to t h e so c ial theory of anarchi sm : 1) it i s
anti-authoritarian , 2 ) it i s social, promoting individual
liberty within a communal setting a nd , 3 ) it r equire s a c onuno n
sense of values i .e., an ethical code .
stirner ' s Dc r Einzige has been c ha r ac ter i ze d a s a case of
the individual against soc ie ty . and s o far as thi s goes there
is no doub t t hat Sti r ner c a n j ust l y be p l aced among the
pragen! tors of anar chistic theo ry . He. t o o. look s upon a l l
forms of a u t hori ty , especially the co erc i v e au thority of the
s t a te , a s the abs o l ute negation of creative individuality .
Poli tical liberty, what a re we t o
unders tand by that? Perha p s t he
i nd i v i du a l ' 5 independenc e o f t he s t ate
and it ' s l aws ? No; on t he c ontrary,
:~:t;n:~~i~~a~~es~~!~~~;o~a~~"~rbe
Bakuni n i s equally r emonstrative i n declar ing :
The s t a t e as I have said before is in
e f f e c t a va s t cemetery wherein a ll the
manifestation of individuals and local
l ife are sacrif iced , where t h e interests
of t he parts constituting the who l e
die and are buried. It i s the al t ar o n
which the real liberty a nd the well-being
of peoples are immolated to politi cal
grandeur; a nd t he more complete this
~:o~~:~:~ni S, the mor e perfect i s
460e r Einzinge . , P. 106 .
" G . P. Madmoff , .Q.E.. cit ., p . 134.
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From this t here i s hardly a qu e st ion t h a t , as r eg ards
t hei r v e h e me nt op position to l aw and g o ve rnme ntal a utho ri ty .
Bakun!n and S t i rner a r e kindred spiri ts . What is common t o
bo t h i s t heir a bsol u t e d edication t o se l f -in teres t a s the
p r i nc iple pre -requi site for a life o f i ndividual freedom. It
r e mai n s a qu e stion, though , whether there is r o om f or bo th
Stirner a nd Bakun!n in thi s s oc iety . Fo r i ndeed, ana r chism
c o nced es t he v a l u e o f b e ing socia l and, co nseq ue n t l y ,
Proudhon , Ba kun!n and I<ropotkin a l l tried t o work ou t the
s ocia l impli cations o f a s y s tem grounded in r adical ind i v idual
f r e edom . How e ver, St i rne r 's world i s unprinc i p l e d a nd a -
social; he d i s s ol v e s society when h e re jects e ntirely i ts
moral , so cial and political d e mand s upon h im. " Le t us not
a sp i r e t o cl) mrnu n i t y, bu t to on e-sidedne s s", 48 h e Bays.
Th e progenitors of anarchisti c theories were wel l a war e
o f t h e d i f fic u lty a s t o how be s t to mediate the inevitable
discord b e tw e en rad i cally free i ndivid u a ls who are s e c ondarily
conun it t ed to a conununal arranqement . Without go vernment a n d
a cod i f ied s ys tem of laws , t h e q ues tion a rises as t o h ow order
a nd equity are t o be maintained i n a s o c i ety where the
dictate s o f the i ndivi du a l are s up reme. It is here that their
optim ism r e scue s their political theory . Anarchists s uch a s
Pr oudhon bel ieved t hat t he pow er o f human r e a son would preva il
in matter s of dispute . Reasoned argulllents would b e pre sented
to an aqent wh o conuni tted or was c on t e mp l a t i n g an act thouqht
48De r Einziqe, p , 311.
"
t o b e wr o n g by the cOlMlunity . Compl iance b y t h e agent r ema ins
h is c ho ice but anarchi s t s wer e co nvinced t hat . foub j ec t t o t h e
a gen t 's own delibe ra tions , r easoned a r guments wo u l d preva i l.
An a n a l og y to this a pproach t ha t .ight be ci t ed is t he
con t e mpo r a ry u s e o f " moral sUlision " . II technique us e d b y
ins t i t u tions and gove r nmen t s t o so l icit voluntary compl i a nc e
t o II req u e st wh i c h wou ld benefi t socie t y a s II who le . Th ere
may no t b e direc t r etribution f or non- c omp lianc e b u t t here is
II po wer f u l moti v e t o do so i n the f ace o f p ub l ic s c r uti ny a nd
o blique cens or ship .
The e a r ly anarchi s ts held t o an instinctive r e s p e c t
for na l i,lr al l a w grounded i n t he bel i ef tha t men a e e b a s i c al ly
good . They there fore be lieved t ha t .lllan ";! sense of j ustice a nd
e q uity wou l d prevail g i ven the r i ght soc i al c irc ums t a nc e s .
This is a n ar gume nt c ogent l y pr es ented by R. W.F: . Paterson i n
Th e Ni h ilis t i c Egoist. "Ana r c h ism t he re fo re requ ires , not a
lower , bu t a i nfini te ly highe r s tanda r d o f e thical co nd uc t
f rom ea c h i ndi v i du al . " " Pa ter s on fe els t ha t the de mands f or
moral s e l f-vigi lance arising out o f a s ocie ty o f i nd iv i dua l
self-d e t e rmining agents woul d be gre ater t han t hat e xpected
f rom a s oc i ety wi t h II r i g i d e t h i c a l cod e s u s t a ined by c oe rcive
fo r c es . "Ana r c hi sm t hus se eks to r eplace an a r t i fi c ia l a nd
ext e r na l poll t ical un ! ty by a s pontaneous a nd 11 v i ng moral
" p a t e r s on , ~ c it . , p . 134 .
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unity ." ~ O I f this i s t r u e t h e n a l l the less would Stirner
approve .
We are i nc line d , if no t ob liged , to agree wi t h Paterson
that Stirner wa s not an anarchi s t except i n t he mos t narrow
s ense of the term . In the first place, to be engaged in a
campaign fo r freedom based on a new theory of social justice
through conununa l ind ividuality is , fo r Stirner , a goal t o
whi ch he r e ma i ns completely i ndif f ere nt . In t he second place,
the anarchi st program pl ac e s e ve ryon e under the au sp ices of an
ideal for which the y are to s t r ive ; a standpoint from wh i c h
they are to make themselves over i nto the ideal L e. , equal,
just , benevolent . Anarchism is a freedom t o develop , to
be come s ome t h i n g which Stirner looks upon as simply another
example of social i d e a li s m and that cursed s t a bi l i t y which
dil utes t he v i tali ty of t he unique individual. Howe ve r
to l erant nn a.narch i st society may be and no matter to wha t
l e n g t hs i t went to insure individua l libert y , it would seem to
f ail the r eq u i r e ments o f our nineteenth century Thrasymachus.
This l ea ds us back t o our earlier question, is Sti r ner
ask ing us t o abandon freedom a l t oge t her; if so , i n favou r of
wha t? The matter rema ins unc l ear at t his po i n t for h e allows
t he term freedom to s tand wh e n he says :
I ha ve no objection t o f r e edom, bu t
I wi sh more than f r eedom f or y ou :
you should not mer ely be rid of what
~Ql bid . , P . 134 .
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yo u do not want; you s houl d not only
be a " f r eeman ", you should be an
"owner " too . ~1
And further :
Must we the n, be c au se free dom betrays
itself as a Christian ideal, g i v e i t up?
No, nothing is t o be lost. freedom n o
mor e than the r e s t ; bu tit i s to become
our ownl~ an d In the form of fre ed om i t
c annot .
While stirner allows the term freedom to stan d he will
no t c ountenanc e t he i dea o f f reedom a nd herein lies the
amb i gu i t y of h is po sition . He says that in ownn e s s no thing i s
to b e l o st , freedom no mor e than t he r e s t . Doe s thi s mea n
t hat ownne ss contains t h e i dea of freed om; or i s ownness
c ot e r mi no us wi th freedom, s i mpl y freedom by ano t her name ?
Ownness i nc l udes i n itself e ve rything
own,and brings to hon or aga i n what
Ch ris tian language d ishonour ed . Bu t
cwnneas has not any al i en s t a nd a r d
ei ther, as it is not i n any sense a n
i dea l ike freed om, mor ality , humanity,
:~dt~~e_ l~~~~r~h is only a desc r i p tio n
I t is just b e cause freedom is an idea and not hing more ,
that he present s o wn ness a s so methi ng more than or, in some
sens e, pri or to freedom. " OWnness . . . is my who l e b e ing a n d
existence, i t i s I myself . .. ~6 It i s to an analys i s o f the
~tDer Einzige, p , 156.
~2Ibi d . , P . 157 .
~ 3 I bid ., P . 171.
~4I bi d . , p , 157 .
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owne r a nd ownne s s as the individual 's whole being and
e xistence that we now turn our attent i on.
..
CHAPTER 4 : ~
4 . 1 Freedo.. of the Radical Individualist
Up to this point Stirner has described freedom as a fi xe d
i d e a which ha s p r evented t h e individual from achieving his own
fi nite possibil ities . Freedom, accord ing to Stirn e r , h a s b e e n
p r e s e nt ed as a d i vi ne r eward fo r s e r vi c e given a t the
discret ion of t hos e who a lread y hav e it L, e , , s oc i e t y . chu r ch
an d state . To what end has freedom be en so presen t ed ?
Accord i n g to Stirner, i t was pres ented In a n effort whether
consciou s or no t , to molli fy and c ont r o l t he " f i rs t ord er"
princ iple of our exis t en ce; our own self-caring and s e l f -
a s sertive ex i stence. Therefore, t he free d om. offere d by
humanity , religI on and the poli tically a stute asks t he
i ndividual to give up what Stirner considers to be h is whole
being and ex i s t e nc e .
Stirner 's ba sic premise i s t ha t ea c h thing cares f o r
i tself and a sserts its own persistence . This sta nd po i nt
places the i nd i vidual in a s tate o f opposition t o a ll t hings
he enco unters . Stirner s a ys, ... . . the c ombat of s e l f -
a s s e r t i on i s unavoidable . .." I n s ay ing s o he sets t he frame
o f reference fo r what is t o b ecome a radi cal interpreta tion of
" I b i d . , p , 9.
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the relationship between the i nd i vi dua l and whatever else
exists .
Thi s aggressive caring for self a lone which Stirner cal ls
"ownness " is a fu nction o f the creative an d destructive
imp u lse of self-assertion which a r i ses ou t o f an original and
una v o i da b l e state of op position . Th us i t may be said tha t one
i s a lready and originally f ree , pe r haps in the same s ens e t h a t
Sartre said man is condemned to be f ree. But i t Is mo r e t han
this, for freedom is merely an idea, i nd eed f o r most, a fixed
idea . OWnness , and this is the essential point, is precisely
the idea of f r e e d om translated i nto t he actual possession of
it .
Humanity c laims t o h a v e reacquired f reedom f o r t he
i rad! vidua l, the s tate c laims to proter.:t it f or: h i m, a n d
s oc i e t y offers t o perfect i t in a spirit of order , e q Ui ty,
justice and r e c iproc i t y . St i rner wil l ha v e none o f thi s for
he me a ns t o aba ndon t he i dea o f f r e edom as such in f a v o ur o f
ownness ; a pure ly se lf-derivative c oncre te exp ression of the
individua l ' s power and pro pe r ty : a resolute acceptance o f t he
unique one's be i ng - fo r -se l f .
I secure my f reedom wi t h r egard t o t he
wor l d in t he de gree that I make t he world
my own , "gain it a n d take possession
o f it " fo r myself, b y wha tever mi ght,
by t hat of persu asio n, of pet ition ,
of ca tegorical dema nd, y e s, even by
hypocrisy, cheating , e tc ., for the means
~~:~ ~ ~~~slor it a re determined by
S~Ib id . , P. 165 .
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Fr om t h i s we c an o bserve t h ree distinct issues wh i c h
c ha rac terize t he so li tary be i ng- f or- s elf portray ed i n ~
Ei n z l ge. F i r s t , t he u n i qu e one exhibits a p s y c holo g i c al
detachme nt fro,n everything peri p heral to his own exis tence .
Se c ond, his r el a t ionshi p to n a ture and t he material or der is
s uc h t ha t ownness i s equated with the ac quisi tia n of property
at h i s disc.re tion an d i n prop or t i on to his powe r , f or
u tilitarian pu r p o ses. Th i r d , there is a complete i nd ifferenc e
t o s piri tual! ty a nd a ny co ncept o f value or an ethical code
whi c h wou l d guide his actions .
4 .1 .1 Ps ychologica l Detachme nt
I t was noted earlier that Stirner's unique one is the
c entre and sanction of a world whi c h exists fo r h i s
proprie t a ry i n t erests . This c onc rete I is not the sum of its
f e a ture s ; i t stands apar t from the incidental fact that he i s
human or Germa n or r a t i onal because the un ique one is
un defin a b l e . He r es erve s f or hi s judgement the power to
cre ate and disso lve a l l thoughts and ob jects as his
disposi tion warran ts . In doing s o he r e ma i ns d i stinc t f rom
his c r eature s. They are noth i ng mor e tha n h i s creations a nd
as t heir owne r he does not allow himself t o become t rans fixed
by their ex istence . To become so would be to give h i ms e lf up
i n f avour o f t he objec t o r the idea i . e ., t o put them a he a d of
h i ms elf. Th is is the i maginati ve s le i ght o f min d wh i c h
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Stlrner uses to distance himself from any possibility of
objec t , thou g h t or fee ling having int r i n s i c value .
Concepts have no i ntr i n s i c v a l u e , t h e ir va l ue 15 o n ly i n
t heir trans ient use fu lness . " Fre e t h inking " 1 . e , , thinking
which s e ts itse l f above t he complete ma n, is thinki ng whi ch
dominates and displays a pure movement of the inw ardne ss of
the merely inward man .
Tota lly dif ferent f rom this f r e e
thinking is own thinking. my
thinking , a thinking which does
not qu Lde me, but is guided,
~~n~~n~~~a~~r~~~ken o ff , by me
The " I" is the beginn i ng and t he end of think ing ; "I" engage
or disengage the process of t h inking at my p leasure and " I "
s usta i n i t as long as it se rves me well.
Stirner says that the t h oughtful 1. e , , thos e who put
thought f irst , fo rge t about the i ndi v i dual i n whom it arose
an d on ly subsequently posi t hi m as b e i ng , an extreme
abstraction . Jus t as i t seems Sti rner wa nts to Abandon the
idea o f f r e e dom, he wants to abandon the abstract I who is t h e
subject o f thought , in favour of t he un ique one as one who i s
pr ior t o t h i s ab stract ion .
Rather t han free t h inking . says s tirner, the unique on e
has proprietar y t h i nki n g . As mas te r of what he t hi nks, the
proprietary thin ke r can dissolve, change , take back into
himse l f and c ons ume t hos e t houghts whi c h mi gh t ot her wi s e cease
~ J l bi d . , P . 339 .
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to b e h i s a nd t h ereby take on a vitality a nd a utho rship of
the i r own .
Th e worl d of t he rel igious and the i dealis ts says
Stir ner , is pre cis e l y a wo rld in whic h t he i nd ividua l b e c ome s
defined by t he i deas a nd va l u e s to which h e se rves . Bu t t he
uniq ue one , as undefinable , h a s no val ue In h i ms el f ; the r e fo r e
n o s tanda r d o f va l ue can ar i.se from him excep t i n so f a r as it
is h is transie nt a nd prlv.lte value o f the momen t .
Every though t is nothing mo r e t h a n anothe r pos ses sion f or
" . . . 1f thoughts a re f ree I am t h e i r s lave . ,, ~,
The tho ught is my own on ly whe n I have
no misgivi ngs abo ut b r ing ing i t in
danger of death eve r y moment, when I
do n ot h a v e to fea r i ts l o s s as a l os s
for me. H --
BegInning with t h ou gh t itself, t h en, Stirner prov ide s a
p s y cho l o g i c al defense a gainst any concept wh ich has t h e
pote nti al to do minate h im , wh e t her t h e concept manifes ts
itse l f as a n i d e a such as fre e d om, l oyalty to the state, o r
p ure ceason itsel f.
"ner Ein~. , P . 345 .
5' Ibid . , P . 342 .
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4 . 1 . 2 Ownne s s. Power and Uti l ity
The posi t ion of de tachment whi c h Stirner assumes with
respect to h i s mental p roper t ies is l i kewis e the s tan dpo i n t
from which he vi ews na t u re and the materi al order . St i rner
r e j ec t s the notion that p rope r ty can b e he ld wh ile s he l t.ered
and sanctioned by mora l pr i nciple s . An indi v idua l shoul d t a ke
a nd hold prop e rty t o t he ex tent that his power t o d o so
permi ts. I t i s f un dame nt al to S t irner' s positinn that
property is a f un c t i on o f powe r and that power and property
a re ce ntra l to his description of t h e owne r . Or, perhap s
be t t e r, ownness is prec isely t hat po i nt at which the i dea of
having something transla tes to h a v i ng i t i n a ctuali t y , fr e ed om
n o l es s t han a nything e lse .
If y ou think i t ove r r ightly , you
do not wan t the freedom t o h a ve al l
these fine t h i n gs , f or wi t h t h i s
fre ed om y ou stil l do not have the m;
you want r e ally t o have t hem, t o call
them~ an d,eP0ssess t he m as
your property .
Stirne r is f Ully aware t ha t the standpoin t of ownness
wi ll necessari ly l e ad to a co ndit i on of i neQ'uali ty among thos e
co ntending for materia l goods . But f o r him i nequality , an d
t h i s is an essentia l point, is t h e co nd i tion ne ce s s ary for t he
unique one t o stand out, t o s t a nd apar t from the s t ul t i f ying
homogen e i t y t he humanists ca l led Man . Th e i nd ividua l must
dec lare h i s own s overeignty, t ake s tock of hi s inventory o f
s t reng t hs, recon noitre t he opp os i tion; for a bove a l l e lse t he
6O I b i d . , P . 155 .
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unique o ne is In o p pos it i on to e verythinq , be the y f ixed
ideas, others , or natur e.
As Sti rne r disassoc i a tes himse l f f rom concepts wh i c h
wou l d assign a r ole f or h i m, j us t s o h e rellloves himself fro ll
the pc s Lt Icn assigned t o h i _ by society an d the s tate with
r e spect t o h i s material s t a t us . He r epud iate s thei r c on t rol
o ver his though t s , d e eds, and pow e r to acqu i re . I n fact i t is
muc h mor e t ha n this . f or t o r epudiate a nd wi s h for more is t o
p articipate i n t he u nending s trug gle f or f reedom to wh i ch h e
i s s o op pos ed . He r e solves, t heref ore, to become l or d an d
master h i mself, he acce pt s hi s s el fi sh ne s s .
To Stirne r , selfishnes s ha s b e e n adu ltera t e d by Chri stian
mor ality as t h e si n fu l lIlo t ive t o action o f a pur e l y sens ua l
Bu t se l f ishness is a sin o nly when d e U ned by some
r el i g i ous s tandard . It i s. theref o r e . t he dei fied state.
d i v i n e h uma n i t y and r e lig ion i ts e l f which I114rks the egoist as
a sinn e r . Sti rner en thusiastica l ly accepts his sel f ishness as
j u s t that !Dotive t o ac ti o n whi c h c ons t i tute s t he being -for -
s e l f he c a ll s ownness. I n his own pri v a t e cons t r uct he is
n e i t he r sin f ul nor s i nless . t he u n i qu e o ne is indi f f e ren t t o
s u c h defin i ng ca t e gori e s .
It c an be a rgued that the uniqu e o n e with po....e x , more or
l e s s. to imp lement h i s se l f i s h mo t ives. e xhibi t s a di s t or t ed
s ense of fre edom based o n a capr i c i ous will t o a c t i on a nd
a cquis i t ion for i ts own sake . To interpre t S t i rner simply as
an i r r a t i o nal vo l uptuary at t he mercy of his sensua l a ppetites
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wou l d miss h i s me a n i ng entirely. He makes this qui t e c lear as
fo l lows :
But is sens uality then the wh o l e o f my
ownness 7 Am I i n my own se nses when I
am given up t o sensuality? Do I f ollow
myse lf. my own de ter mina t ions , when I
follow t ha t? I a m my~ on ly when
I am ma s t er of mysel f , i nste ad of
~;i~~y~~~~:r:1s:~flher by se ns uali ty or
Stirne r d o e s no t h o l d t he world a nd i ts comforts
h a v i n g any intrinsic value, as being des irable for i t s own
sake . No d ou b t this is the world of a detached u nemotio n a l
predator who cons umes t o t h e extent that his power t o do so
permits. But thi ng s are desired as a means t o an end, an e n d ,
it is essential t o no t e , which is who l ly complete i n i ts
usefu l ness to t he un i que one . His mot i ves a re pure l y
ut i l i t a r i an in an ego istic sense , not idealistic.
4 .1 . 3 I nd if f e r e nce t o spirituali ty
What t his detached pos t ure u t terly leaves behind is any
commi tment to a qualitative, mor a l , or s p i ri t ua l dimension t o
the u nique one and h i s r e l a t i on s hi p to the wor l d. The uni que
on e is absorbed pr imarily in a r ela tionsh i p wi th the
phenomenal order but t h i s r elati on s hi p with t he outer order
begins an d ends with i ts useab leness . In Der Ei n zige t here is
no inclination f or t he individual t o redeem him s e lf by som e
fixed s p i r i t ua l re l ationshi p with the world and t hose in it .
6 l I b i d . , P . 169 .
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Rather. for Stirner, any kind of commitment to the world
ne ce s s ar i l y involves some ki nd of se lf-renunciation. There Is
no a ttempt t o e sca pe or a void his destructiv e sol i tude . On
the c ontrary, it i s from within a kind of psycholQgi c al
s a r c op h a gus that the unique on e stalks the phenomenal order ,
consuming i t and h imself I . e. , h e lives himself eut •
Whether what I think and do is
Christian , what do I care? Whether
it i s human, l i b e r a l, humane , what d o
I ask a b o u t that? If on ly it accomplishe s
what I want , if only I satisfy mys elf
;~ ~~~ ~~~~;o~~r~:Yai~ :~i~ePr~:i~:~~2S
In hi s utter disinterest for the i dea l L e . a ny s ub j ect
of devotion and self - sacr if ice, the un ique one also d eni e s the
predicates which define and s u ppo r t the SUb j e c t . Karl Lowi th
points out that to deny the s ub jec t is not nece s sarily to d eny
the predicate i t s e l f . 61 For e xample, on e can re ject t he i d e a
of a divine being but accept that which might define or
describe thi s being I.e. i nfinite l ove, truth a nd compassion .
But Stirner 's re jection of the ideal and the s p i ri t ua l in a ll
forms i s complete a n d un r ese rve d .
According to this, l o ve is to be t he
~ i n man, his d i vinenes s , t h a t which
does h im honor , his t rue h uma n i ty . • .
c on sequently, by the transformation
of the predicate into the subj ect, the
U 1b i d . , P . 357 .
6JI<a r l Lowith, From Hege l to Ni etzsche . Ne w York: Doub leday,
19 67 , p , 336 .
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Christ ian e s s ence (ana it i s the pred icate
~~~; ~~n~~~~~ ~=: ::;:n~=~r~~~i~:~; ~ uWOUld
Stirner n o t only seek s the d issolution of the s p i r i t ua l and
the e sse n c e s whi ch define its existence, but the essences
t h emselve s . In thi s he com ple tes a n ex treme r eduction of
everything as a function o f hi s own fle l l-wi l l and self-ca r ing
a ge nd a .
4 .2 Et hical Solipsism
I s it tru e that the whole human projec t of de veloping and
d e fi n i ng a s ystem o f values i .e., t he category of e t h i c s
itse lf , i s to a large degree a function of ou r s t andpo int
r especting f r eed om? I f i t i s s o , the ethical choic es we make
must be mad e wi thin t he conte xt of their impact on others ; a
c r e d i ble ethical system must involve a sense of justice and
r e c iproc i ty . But i n De r Einzige there is no sens e o f
responsibili ty or consideration for others even though the
e goist may appear to act in an a ltrui sti c manner . That act
may be a disguised f orm of a purely s e l f - s eek i n g agenda,
perhaps to avoid soc ial conflict , gain some advantage or inner
satisfaction. Indeed , Stirner denies the whole category of
altru ism a s nothing mor e than covert self-interest .
But how about that " do i n g the good for
t he good' s sake " without prospect for
reward? As if here too the pay was
U Oe r Einzlge , p . 48 .
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no t contained in the satisfaction
that it is to & fford . ·~
If f reedom Is the starting po i nt o f a ny ethi cal s y s t em
and if Stirner is Ask ing us t o abandon freedom a s an ab stract
ideal; it seems to follow that he is likewise a sking us to
give up ent ire l y t he c a t e go ry of e t h ics i n f avour o f a r ad i c al
affirmation of our i n d i v idu a l egoistic s elve s .
Egoism does not think of sacr ificing
anyth ing, giv ing away anythi ng that
:';n~a~t:~s~ t h:~:P;~dd:~1~e~~o~~~; . b.
And further:
Take hold, a nd take wha t you r e q u ire I
Wit h t h i s the war of al l against all
;~ l~e~~:~~~l . I a l one decide wh a t I
With the declara tion " I a l o ne decide " Sti r ne r casts h is eqo i sm
In t he mo u l d o f the mos t s eve r e e t hi c a l sol itude ; a solitude
i n whIch there is no room for freedom e ithe r a s an ideal in
itself o r ee a condui t fo r any social or poll t i c a l ideals.
By Stirne r 's account in Der Einzlqe there i s ll ttl",
dis tinction, if a ny, to be made betwee n ownness and ego i sm .
on several occasions he equa tes t he use of the t e rm s . For
example , in di s c us sing the ear ly Ch r i s t i a n r e jection of
ne e t he n mora li t y he says, " . . . bu t they d id t h i s f or the sake
of their s ou ls we lfare too , therefor e ou t o f e go i s m,
.5I b i d . , p . 164 .
M 1b i d . , p . 257 .
6 l I b i d . , p . 25 7 .
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~.,,~a A little f urther he says, "And i t wa s by this
eg oism, thi s~ that they go t rid of the old wor ld of
God s . "." Dwnnes s and egoism a re identical and Stirner I 5
unique o ne is the c o nc rete "I" who come s before t he abstrac t
" I " defined by the ide al of freedom.
What is left when I have been freed
from e verything t hat is not I? on ly
I ; nothing but I. n",;. freedom has
nothing to offer thi s I himself . As
iO h:e:t b~~O~~Wf;~e~a~~~~d~~r~=e~i~:~~~?O
As further e videnc e :
Why not choose the I himsel f a s
beg i n n i ng, middle , a nd e nd ? Am
I not wor th mor e t han f reedom? ...
think t ha t over well, and decide
whether you will p lace on your ban ner
~~e":~~~~m~: ~~r~~~~:s~f.. the r e so lution
Acc or d ing l y, S tirner finds it i mpos s i b l e to accept any
system whic h de mands his compl iance. As an owner he resists
the de bilitating e ffe c t s of any ordered system in which, by
his terms, he i s r e gar de d a s mer e ly an object among objects .
He therefore r e f us e s to be conscience -bound out of any sense
o f l oya l t y or mora l ob l igation .
68 I b i d . , p. 163.
(o')I bid . , p. 163 .
" naa. , p , 163 .
7 1I b1d . , p , 163 .
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CHAPTER 5: OWNNE5S AND EXISTENTIAL F REEDOM
5 .1 St i rne r' s Amoralism
It bec ome s incr eas i ng ly cle a r i n Ocr Ei nz ige t ha t the
fre ed om Sti r ne r describes as ownness is i ncompati ble wi th an y
t rad i t I ona l standpoin t on thi s most f undament a l o f human
i s sues . For St i rner , a ny ide a which s t an d s a pa r t from or
transce nds the i ndividua l is nothin fj more than an ell:ternlll
a uthori ty which demand s the i nd ividual ' 5 sub o r d i n a t i o n.
Ra t he r , ownness demands t he collaps e of a l l exte r na l
a uthor ity . For exam ple , t he state af firmed as idea l or
absol u t e , is the e a r t h l y ma n i fes ta t i on of Heg el ' s absolute
s piri t and the r epos itory or , perhaps be t t er , the p r od uc t of
reason and f r eedom. But to avail of thi s freedom the
individua l must be a .. embe r, flu s t c ontribute , mus t c omp ly, and
f or Stirner t his i s the a po t heos is o f unfreedom a nd self -
s a c r i fi ce . We hav e also r e marked that t he hu man i stic s o l u t ion
to the prob l e m o f freedom ..,hi eh be g i ns with the specie s Man
rather than God or a bs o l u t e s p i ri t is, accordi ng to Stirner,
an equally ab stract derivation o f i deali sm . Karl Lowith
e xpresses the humani stic convers i on o f Hegel' s real i stic
c ontent a nd i de al i stic form as foll ows :
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Wi t h Fe ue rba ch , the exac t reverse is
t rue . He is r e a listic in f orm, us i n g
ma n as h i s po int o f d e parture, bu t h as
nothin g to say of the worl d i n whi ch thi s
man liv es .. and 50 man r emains t he s ame
:~~~~:~~h;a~ft~:i i;~~n~fie s Ubject o f t he
consequently, t he pa r ticu lar v iew o f freedom offered by b oth
idealism and hu manism gives 11 ttle r e sp ect t o the unique
individua l wi t h whom Stirner i dentifies .
What , t hen, is t he d i s t i nc t i on which makes ownness so
e s s en ti a l l y di f ferent from freedom ? We c an say tha t it is not
simpl y a ma t t e r of having more freedo m Le. t he i ssue is n o t
a ma tter of i nc r e ment a l inc r ea s e s since ownness is all , it is
the i nd ividua l ' 5 who l e being and existenc e . For Stirner ,
t herefore, t he Ls sue is o f ontologic al s i gnif icance . But it
is li kewise f or any t r aditional v iew of f r eedomi there is a n
int i mate and reciproca l rel a tion s h i p betwe en f r e edom an d all
a spects o f human cul t ure . As has been said throughout , this
is e s pe c i ally s o with respec t t o the rel a tionshi p be tw e en
f r e edom and value . If Sti r ne r abandons the t r aditiona l v iews
of freedom in favour of ownnes s , he mus t do so i n t he f u l l
knowl edge that he chal lenges , if no t un de rmines, t he enti re
r a ng e of t he human cultural mat r ix . Most important o f all
perhaps is that ownness i s i nd i ffe r ent t o any sys tem o f
va lues .
12Lowi t h , ~. ci t . , p , 308 .
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As the au thor of his own standa rd o f valuation, the
un ique on e presc r i b e s a mor al e t hos ba s e d on absolute s e l f-
wi l l , po we r a nd eg oistic u tility . But thi s i s t o prescri be no
s tanda r d o f mora lity a t a l l since i t f ollows t hat everyone is
e nti t led to t a ke the same standpoint . Everyo n e can evoke h is
own egoistic impo r tance a nd se l fishness t o the exclusion of
the whole of man k i nd . 7l
It is difficu l t t o res ist the co nclusion that the
egoist 's amora l and d i s intere s t e d posture l e a ve s b e h i nd the
se l f who is l os t in t he s piritua l world , the f r e e world , an d
pre s en t s an i ndividl'al t o tal l y a bsorbed in his own s e l f - c a r i ng
dominion . Many o f t he themes des cribed a bove are, o f course ,
clos ely related t o themes expressed by the a theistic form o f
exis tential thought . It i s t o this we now t ur n to see ho w far
t hi s line of t houg ht mi ght describe what Stirner has i n mi nd
by ownness .
5.2 Existent i a l Freedom
Wh en Nietzsche p r oc laimed t he deat h o f God he had only
expressed in clear t e r ms wha t had been underway s i nce He gel ;
a movement a way from a "wor l d v iew" whic h r equire s a bsolut e
trus t i n a d i vi ne ag ent po s s essing c reative a uthor i ty . In a
sense Heg el p r epared 'the gr oun d f or t h i s movemen t by equat ing
llJ • Laur in, Ni etzsch e . New Yor k : Has ke l l House pu blishers
Ltd ., 197 3, p . 188- . - - -
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the object of the rel igious consciousnes s with the object of
the s pe c ulative intellect . This a t t e mp t by Hegel to reconcile
the fi nit e and the i n fi n i te, man and God, was the highest
activity of the r a t iona l human spirit . But for many who
f ollowed Heqel the highest activity of t h e r ational human
s pir i t i s just t hat , a hu man activity .
Th e attempted Hegelian me d iat i o n of the divine and the
human , God and speculati ve r e a s on , was the first step towards
a dimi nuti on o f the divine a nd precipitates a view i n which
freedom i s e ntirely compl ete in the i ndividual himself. F.e .
Copleston expresse s t he i mpa ct of thi s ca nfl a t i on o f the
d ivine and th e human as fo l l ows.
The anti thes i s between God dnd Man i s
thus diminished or blurred . The ab stract
i de a o f God i n h i ms e l f and t he abst.ract
idea of man a pa r t from God are reconciled
in the concrete concept of world-spirit.
~~:o~~~aG~~ ~~do~o~~: ~~; :~a~~~e::a~~?7'
With the death of God it i s a short step to a vision of
the individual as either an instance of the conc ept of
humani t y or as un ique ....i th no other foundation but himself .
As d i scussed earl ier , Stirner would argue that any account of
the indi'll.1dual a s merely an instance of the concept of
humanity remains bound up with theism . Therefore the d eath of
God is also the death of an y essentialist concept of Man .
Rather , Stirner de scribes the c oncreto individual who accepts
H F . C . copleston, Existentialism and Modern Man . London :
B1a ckfriars Publications, 1953 . p , 13.
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his finitude, pa s sions, mortality, an d sets about a process of
se l f - c rea tion by c hoosing h imsel f a nd , therefore, de r i v i ng
value from himself. 1~ This is an existe ntiali st theme which
ha s profound imp lications f or the c onc ept of freedom and its
Attendant ethical i s sues .
I n existentialism a s in pe rhaps no other movement of
philosophical thought the issue of f r eed om is central. As a
philosophy of the i ndividual i t presents a sense of freedom
vie we d from a uniquely personal perspe ctiv e . Bu t it must be
noted t ha t there are many va riations on t h is theme . Fo r
example, Kier kegaard atte mpted t o r elocate the individ ual i n
his relat ionship to God by un derlining t he signif i cance of
commitment a nd faith rather than a r a t i ona lization of this
relationship .
The e xisting individual who chooses
to pursue the ob jective way enters
upon the en t i r e a pp r OXimation-proce s s
by which it i s proposed t o b r i ng God t o
light obj ectively. aut this i s in a ll
eternity imposs ible, because God i s a
~~~~:~~iv~~; ~~e~~~~~~n:~; ~ hs only f or
Alternatively, Ni e t zsche drew what he c c ns i cere c to be the
logical conclus ion of an existential dialec t ic ba s ed o n
atheism; if God does not e x i s t there a r e no c ompe l ling r e asons
why an individual need be bound by c onv ent i o nal mor al
1!De r Einzige, p. 315.
" s e r e e Kierkegaard , Con cluding Unsc ientific postscript.
translated by David F . Swenson. Princeton : Princeton University
Press, 195 3 , p , 178 .
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s een derds , Rathe r , men s hould de ve lop a ne w und e r s t anding of
what it eeens to value something , an unde rstanding wh ich 15
opposed to ethical institutionalism and its rigid manip ul atf.vE:
suppression of t he i ndlvidudl's wil l to power .
But f o r both t he r e ligiou s Al"d secular views, an
important e lement i n an exis tentia l dialectic is t o r e a li ze
t ha t we a re firstly exis ting s ub j e c t s . fi n ite and t emporal.
As s uch man is b e co ming i.e., incomplete. s econdly , in
co nf ronting our s elv e s in i so latIon we a re free t o cho ose what
we wi ll be co me , fre e to e,c t a s soon a s we be c ome self-
consc i ous. The qu e stion remains a s to ho w we are t o act . Are
t he r e value s upon wh i ch thi s fre ed om to a c t i s to be bas ed ?
Or is freed om the fi rst order principle of exis tenc e wh i ch is
itse l f wi t hou t f ou nd a tion an d r eq ui r e s no justi ficat i on ?
Jean-Paul Sartre is perha ps t he s emina l t h i nker in t he
existentialis t t r a dit i on who most earnestly strugg l es with t he
question of f reedom , Like Ni etzsche he depic t s a cultural
setting in wh i ch the dea th o f God is an existentia l f a ct and
the beg i nn i n g of se lf-development 1n f reedr-m is coinciden t
with a r ec og n i tion of this f ac t . Sa rtre 's a theis tic p rogram
de s cribes a process of se lf-d iscovery and free dom f ou nd ed on
the liber a ti n g effects of athei sm and a se l f un f e t t ered by
a prior i r u l es o f conduct . The only r ul es are t hos e which t he
i nd i v i dual p rescribes f or himself and the on l y values are
thos e leg i slated by h i s own s e lf prop os ed goa l s , Clearly , f or
Sartre , f reedom is t he f ounda t i on of an y sense of va l ue which
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may underlie t h e choices we make. conccmrtantly. f reedom i s
not something we acquire , it is no t a warded or added on to us ;
it is what we are i n the most original s e n s e . This i s how
Sartre portrays the relationship between f reedom and values .
Value derives i t s being from its exigency
and no t i t s exigency f r om i t s b e ing . I t
does not deliver i ts e lf to a corrt.emp.l a't L ve
i n t ui t ion which would apprehend it as
being value and thereby would remove from
it i t s r ight over my freedom . On the
contrary, it can be r evealed only to an
active freedom which makes i t e xist as
v a l ue by t h e sale fact of recognizing
i t as such. It fo llows that my freedom
i s t he uni que foundation of values a nd
that nothing , abso l ute ly nothing ,
j ustifies me in adopti ng thi s or that
part i c u l a r va l ue, thi s or that particular
scale of va lues. As a being by whom va l ue s
exist , I am unjus tifiable . My freedom 1s
anguis hed at b e i ng the fo undation of va lues
while itself without fo undati on . /I
Sartre 's exam i nation of being distinguishes between the
for-itself and the i n-itself , conscious man and unconscious
objects. Sartre presents a phenomenological account of
consciousness in which the for-itself i s aware , fi r s t ly , of
the difference or the gap be twee n itsel f and the world o f
objects. Secondly , the f o r - i t s e l f is aware of its own
interna l nothingness or e mpt i ne s s . "The internal nothingness
actually is .. , wha t constitu tes consciousness . Without it ,
a man would be a solid massif t hing incapable o f perception or
77Jean- PalO.l Sartre, Being a nd Nothi ng ness . Translated by Hazel
E. Barnes . New York : Washing ton Sq ua re Press, 1966 , p , 76 .
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se lf-determination.,, 1 ~ Nothingness comes into t h e worl d
through the conscious being t . e . the for- itself, who is its
own nothingness . 79 As t he cons c i ous being whose essence is
yet to be determined, t he for-itself is f ree t o fi ll t h i s
emptiness i n whatever manner he chooses ; herein lies t he
freedom which cultivates man's possibi lities Le . freedom is
the medium by which man i s self-determining man .
As an inner str ucture of consciousness , "Human fre edom
precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of
the huma n being i s suspended in his freedom." lo Thus, freedom
!! enc for-i t self whose choices and values are r adica l ly
unfounded in any ideal human reality or uni ve rsa l pr i nc iple
other than f reedom i t s e l f .
As the being through whom va lues ex ist , to the extent
they exist a t al l, our freedom is precisely the conscious
choice of a l ternatives and t he a c ceptanc e of the
responsibili ty which this f reedom o f choice demands . It is a
responsibility accepted in anguish , according to Sartre , s i nce
i t is impossible to ground our choices i n a ny fixed or fi rst
order r ul e s of conduct. Man, fo r Sartre, is t ha t nothingness
whose ch a llenge it is to make t he world a co herent r eality out
of his own cons c i ous cho ices; not those ma de by others pas t or
18Ma r y warnock , Existentialism. London : Oxf or d Uni ver sity
Press, 19 70, p , 97 .
19Be i ng and Nothi ngness , ~ . .£.!!. , p . 57 .
H0 1b i d . , p , 60.
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pre sent , and not t h os e ordained by powers whi ch derive the i r
a u thori t y froll tribal or divine code s . The for-itself a l one
is t he i nc o r ri g i ble s ource of i t s own fu t u re . Sartre ' s .. a n
i s , in a mo s t profound sense. a man o f t he futu r e , a IlIan ye t
to be.
I t i s very n early suc h a pers p e c t i ve t ha t St i r ner put
forward a full century ear lie r. Al though Stirner woul d s ay
that nothing ca n be justified by appe aling to "b eing", -\ there
a re striking s i milari t i e s b e 'twe en Sti r ne r and Sartre
r e s p e c t ing the i r ontological po s i t i o n s . For e xamp le Sartr e
s ays:
Th e Be ing by which Nothingne ss arr i ve s
i n t he world is a being s u c h that i n
its Be ing , t he Nothi ng ne s s of i t s Be i ng
is in qu estion . Th e be ing by which
~~~h~~n~~~h~~;~:s:~l2the world mus t be
Sti rner seems to ant i c i pa te Sa rtre : " I aJll all in a l l,
con sequent l y even abs t r a c tion or Not hi ng; I am a ll a nd
Nothing . "'l Another ve ry ob vi ou s simi lari ty ap pears i n
Sartre' s c l a im: '· Man cannot be so metimes slave and s omet i mes
free ; he is wholly and f or eve c free or he is not free at
alL"" It i s no d iffe rent with St irne r: " Freedom can only
" ne e Ei nzig8 . p , 341-
UBe i ng and Nothingne ss, p , 57 .
'lCe r Einzige, p . 33 .
" Be i ng and Nothing, p. 569 .
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b e t he who le of freedom; a piece of fr e edom i s not f r eedom. " n
A further evidence that Sartre and Stirne r are kindred spiri t s
i s Sllrtre's s t a t e me n t that f reedom is not a q ua lity o r
property of h i s nature but, " . . . i t i s very exactly the s tu f f
o t my being . ,, 8 6 Similar ly Stirner says t h a t own ness is his
who le being and e x i s t e nce , " . . . i t i s I myself . ,,87
With these a nd other r e ma r ka bly s imilar po s itions
might think thnt Sa r t re' 5 f r e ed om a nd Stirne r I 5 ownness a re
eq uiva lent . The i ntellectua l similarities betwe e n Sartre and
Stirner are un mi sta ka ble but there a re notable d i f fe rences ,
especially with respect t o t hei r compo rtment t o t he wor ld and
those in i t .
For e xample, ima gine it i s Stirner ' s unique one who i s
t he furti ve f igure crouched at the ke yhole as Sa rtre has
descr ibed . UB It would s eem un likely that the u n ique one would
be para lysed in shame by the " look " o f t he other . Shame is
no t a ca tegory for t h e owner or ownne s s, s hame i s a
ps ychol ogical state wh ich is manifestly religious a nd as s uc h,
the unique one would regard the "look" with cool indifference .
A fur ther di s t inction can be po i nted to wi th respect to
Sartre 's provocative s tatement that ma n is c ondemne d t o be
fr ee . The existential a nguish experienced in v iew o f t h is
"uer Ei nzige, p . 160.
~ hBe i nq an d Nothingn e s s, p , 566 .
~"Der Einzige, p . 157 .
•ABe i ng and Nothingness , p , 347.
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f reed om impl i e s a cer tain morose tone o f f util i ty . The r e is
implie d a sense o f r e gret t hat ma n ' s project of be ing Lve , t he
inclinati on o f the for -itself t o become the i n -i ts e lf , t o
be c o me so lid or " massi f " as Sartre has put it, is indeed a
use less an d f u t ile con tradiction .
All c rea t u res, he bel i e ve s, ha ve , as
their deepes t instinct , t he i ns tinct
t o fi ll up ho les, a nd to abolish
emptiness where ve r the y find i t .
So huma n be ings long to possess the
SQlidity of thin g s . But if t hey we r e
solid a nd com p l ete , t hey would
necessar i l y l os e t he ir consciousness.
And they do not wi sh to be come
un c on s c i o u s . Thus, what t hey wi sh fo r
~~n=c~~~:~a=~~t;~n~h:h:~m:i~~m:Om~:Sif .a~
Fu r t her , Sart re 's existenti a lism seems t o have a moral
q ua lity to it since eac h mora l Co ge nt is conscious of his
f r e edom in anguish . As t he unique source of va l ue each moral
a ge n t i s c ondemne d t o decide how he is t o a ct, ho w he is to
use hi s freedom. Th e r e seems t o r ema i n i n Sar t re a moralistic
bias where by the exis ten tially f r e e individual in choosing,
choose s on b e half o f a ll manki nd . As a man o f t he f u ture , a
man yet to be , t here rema i ns t he qu ali ty of a c a use and a
truth f or all ma nk i nd . One can well imagi ne Stirner 's
r e sponse : yo u have " v , . a n i deal tha t be c kons to yo u . Yo u ha ve
a f i xed idea . ,,9n I n longing fo r the ideal, a n impossi b le
8~arnock , ~ . cit . , p , 10 6 .
9tlDe r Einz i ge, p . 43.
69
cont r ad iction, Sartre's man 1s ab and one d 1n t he wor l d; left in
freedom to overcome this predicament.
For Stirner t hi s predicament wou l d n o t b e an obstac l e t o
overcome but a n opportuni t y to be exploi ted i n t he f u l l
know ledge that t h e ideal in any form 15 indeed a u s ele s s and
meaning less goa l . He. therefor e, unreservedly proclaims the
ne w domini on o f t h e ego i s t in the mos t r e d ou b t abl e terms.
The egoist, t u rning against the demands
and co ncepts o f t he present, exercises
~;~;~::~~~n~heN:~~in;e~:u~:~;s~o-~im . '1
Wi t h this resolve the e go i st assures himse l f ins tant and
continuous gratification , a t l ea s t psycho logica l l y, in his own
t r a n s i e n t an d fi nite worl d . This Is Stirner's posture of
d i s e nga ged i n t r os pecti on through ownness or , wha t amounts to
the same thi ng , h i s r adical egoism .
5.3 Conclusion
The uni que one r e f us e s to be c ome f i xed by any idea l,
there i R no frame of r efere nc e wi t h i n wh i ch h e will a qu i es c e
t o a system o f va lues or mora l entitlement . Rat her , the
unique one is the point of reference who is prO foundly
ind i f f e r e n t to a ny sys tem o f va lues moral or ot he rwise . But ,
we may observe, a point is i t s el f an abs t rac t ion and i t may be
t ha t the ve r y c ha rge Stirner directs ag a inst free do m as a
~ 1 , p , 184 .
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l iberal-humanist abstraction , can just as easily be turned
against the unique one .
The unique on e faces the human predicament as
characterized by existential freedom with a for thright inner
r esolve to accept and, indeed, affirm the truth o f nihil i sm .
St i r n e r does not simply look at the world and observe what he
take s to be its meaninglessness; that too, but more he i s
resolved to create and cons ume it t h r o ug h his radical egoism.
We are therefore obliged to take him qui te s eriously and
literally when he says , "All things are n o t h i ng to me .,, ~l
This i s not a statement of indifferenc e nor s i mp l y the
manif e station of a cynica l mind . The r e is s i mp l y t oo much
ev idence present in Dar Einzige that thi s is a pointed
affi r mation o f the nothingness in which the un ique o ne Is the
heginning , middle a nd end . The unique one endorses
d iscontinuity, embraces instab ility and inequality if t.hey
s t.a nd to his own advantage . In other words, the unique one 's
comportment to t h e world and t ho s e i n i t , is drawn entirely
an d exclusively from a radically personal t r ut. h that
absolutely nothing is worthy of diluting his thoroughgoing
egoi sm .
From the foregoIng analys is we can say with some
confidence that ownnes s i s a function of t he s e l f - c a r i ng
i ndividual who separet.es himself from all e xternal r e straints
and makes of the wor ld wha t e ve r he will . To adopt the moral
92I b i d . , p . 366 .
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p o s ture of the un iqu e one, wh i ch i s the abs e nce of a n y moral
pos t u re at a l l, is t o s imulta ne o us ly a ban don the s pirit o f
freedom i n a ny t radi t i o nal sense . As discussed, e ven the mos t
libertarian s t andpoi n t on fre ed om ca nnot f ul ly accou n t f or the
u ni q ue one 's self-caring age nda . One is l e f t wi th very l itt l e
l at i tude fo r interpre tation whe n c onf r onted by one who can
say, " No t h i n g is mo r e t o me t han my s e l f . " ')]
It is a truis m to s tate t h a t e x i ste nc e a n d f reedom i n the
wor ld is existence and fre edom with ot hers . Whe n va lues a re
co ns idered t o be a b y - p r o du ct o f freedom one mi g ht challenge
this being pure ly subjec-tLve or perhaps merely
re lativistic. But Stirner 's ownness goes even fu rther, i t is
an explicit denia l o f any sense of being-for-o t hers and an
e qu a lly exp licit de nial o f value altogether. Ownness is a
standpoin t f r om ....h ich a l l "op pos i t i on van i s he s i n complete
severance or singlene ss" , g- wha t Hege l ha s r efe r r e d t o as t he
" .. . pu r e r eflec t i on o f the ego int o i tse l f. •• , t he
un r es t ric t ed infini ty o f absolu te abstr action or universali ty,
t he pure though t of oneself . g5" Qwnness i s so meth ing b e yon d
good and evil o r an y conceptual ethical scheme; it is , indeed,
s ome t h i ng beyond or pri or to freedom, but perha p s only in the
sense o f being i t s p ur e st abstraction .
g)I b i d . , p , 5 .
'1-.I b i d . , p , 209 .
'l~G. W . F . Hegel , Philosophy of Rig ht. Trans l a ted T .M. Knox .
Londr "' : Oxford Uni ve r s ity Pre s s , 1971 , p , 21.
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Fi nal ly , if 4 philosophy of fre e d om, in llny sense of the
t erm, involves a socia l dimension an d is mean t t o be not onl y
though t o f bu t lived in a spi rit of j ust ice and mutual
respect , one i s not s ure h ow this i s at all possible in t he
..,o r ld o f the unique o ne and his own .
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